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Abstract
Nonzero sum games typically have multiple Nash equilibriums (or no equilibrium),
and unlike the zero sum case, they may have different values at different equilibriums.
Instead of focusing on the existence of individual equilibriums, we study the set of values
over all equilibriums, which we call the set value of the game. The set value is unique by
nature and always exists (with possible value ∅). Similar to the standard value function
in control literature, it enjoys many nice properties such as regularity, stability, and
more importantly the dynamic programming principle. There are two main features
in order to obtain the dynamic programming principle: (i) we must use closed-loop
controls (instead of open-loop controls); (ii) we must allow for path dependent controls,
even if the problem is in a state dependent (Markovian) setting. We shall consider both
discrete and continuous time models with finite time horizon. For the latter we will also
provide a duality approach through certain standard PDE (or path dependent PDE),
which is quite efficient for numerically computing the set value of the game.
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1
1 Introduction
In a standard stochastic control problem, the value function is well-defined and is the unique
(viscosity) solution of the associated HJB equation, or the path dependent HJB equation
in a path dependent setting. The existence and/or uniqueness of optimal controls often re-
quire stronger conditions (typically certain compactness and/or convexity conditions). We
remark that the value exists even if there is no optimal control; additionally, when there are
multiple optimal controls, they share the same value. Similar results hold for two person
zero sum games under the Isaacs condition, where one may study the unique game value
without requiring the existence or uniqueness of the equilibriums (saddle points). We refer
to the book Mertens, Sorin, & Zamir [28] for a general exposition of the theory and Pos-
samai, Touzi, & Zhang [33, Section 2] for a literature review on continuous time two person
zero sum stochastic differential games. The situation is quite different for nonzero sum
stochastic differential games. There have been many works on the existence of Nash equi-
libriums, by using either PDE method or BSDE method, see e.g. Bensoussan & Frehse [4],
Buckdahn, Cardaliaguet, & Rainer [6], Cardaliaguet & Plaskacz [8], El-Karoui & Hamadene
[13], Friedman [18], Hamadene [19], Hamadene, Lepeltier, & Peng [20], Hamadene & Man-
nucci [21], Hamadene & Mu [22, 23], Lin [26], Mannucci [29, 30], Olsder [31], Rainer [34],
Sun & Yong [37], Uchida [38], and Wu [39], to mention a few. We emphasize that, unlike
stochastic control problems or zero sum games, in the nonzero sum case different equilib-
riums could lead to different values, which makes it difficult to study the game value in a
standard manner when there are multiple equilibriums. On the other hand, when there is
no equilibrium, it becomes inconvenient even to define the game value.
We shall define the game value as the set of the values of the game over all equilibriums,
which we call the set value of the game. For general set valued analysis, we refer to the book
Aubin & Frankowska [2]. With the empty set as a possible set value, both the existence
and uniqueness of the set value of the game is always guaranteed by definition. It turns out
that this set value behaves benignly as the (real-valued) value function in stochastic control
theory: it enjoys the regularity, stability, and most importantly, the Dynamic Programming
Principle (DPP for short) in an appropriate sense. When the set value is a singleton, e.g.,
in two person zero sum games or in stochastic control problems (a “game” with only one
player), it reduces to a standard value function (real or vector valued) and satisfies a (path
dependent) PDE.
Our idea of studying the set value for nonzero sum games follows the line of, among
others, Abreu, Pearce, & Stacchetti [1] and Sannikov [36]. The work [1] considers the set
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value of an infinitely repeated game in discrete time over all sequential equilibriums. Due
to the homogeneousness of the game, its set value is time and state invariant and thus is
actually a fixed set, or say a set valued constant. It is shown in [1] that this set value
satisfies the so called factorization and self-generation, which is exactly in the same spirit of
our DPP. The work [36] considers a similar game, but in continuous time models. The set
value is again a fixed set, and the main focuses of [36] are the characterization and geometric
properties of this set as well as their economic implications. Another highly related work is
Cardaliaguet, Quincampoix, & Saint-Pierre [9], which uses viability theory. The main focus
of [9] is the numerical approximation for the set of initial states satisfying some required
properties. Our goal is to study standard nonzero sum games in finite time horizon, both
in discrete time and in continuous time models, and we shall investigate systematically the
dynamic set value of the game over all Nash equilibriums.
In Section 2 we study the discrete time model. Besides establishing the DPP, in the
spirit of [1], our main contribution is to show that, even in the state dependent (or say,
Markovian) setting, the DPP would fail if one restricts to state dependent equilibriums.
Consequently it is necessary to consider path dependent controls in order to have the DPP,
which is not the case for stochastic control problems and zero sum games and is due to the
non-uniqueness of the values (though the set of values is always unique). While already
studied in the literature in various contexts, we also show that DPP would fail if we restrict
to Pareto optimal equilibriums and discuss how to choose an “optimal” equilibrium by
introducing a central planner. Another highly relevant problem, although not discussed in
this paper, is to estimate the model parameters with the presence of multiple equilibriums,
for which we refer to the survey paper Ho & Rosen [24, Section 2] and the references therein.
We shall also remark that, as already observed in Pham & Zhang [32], through Buckdahn’s
counterexample for zero sum games, to ensure the DPP for the game value we need to
consider closed loop controls rather than open loop controls.
In Section 3 we study our main object: a continuous time model in a path dependent
setting. It is in general difficult to study the true equilibriums in this model. Motivated
by [6] and [28, VII.4], we relax the set value of the game to the limit of the value sets
over all ε-equilibriums. Then the set value will be compact and will be nonempty as long
as there exist ε-equilibriums for all ε > 0, which is a much weaker requirement than the
existence of true equilibriums (see e.g. Frei & dos Reis [17] for an example) and is sufficient
for practical purpose in most applications. This is exactly in the spirit of the stochastic
control problems, where the value is the limit of the values over ε-optimal controls. Indeed,
for stochastic control problems and zero sum game problems, the (standard) value function
3
corresponds to this relaxed set value, not the original one from true equilibriums when an
optimal control or saddle point does not exist. We believe this approach of the values could
be efficient in more general control/game problems where the optimal control/equilibrium
may not exist or is hard to analyze.
Our next result is the regularity (sensitivity with respect to the state process) and
stability (sensitivity with respect to the coefficients) of the set value, under mild regularity
assumptions on the coefficients. These results have fundamental importance in applications.
As a consequence we obtain the measurability of the set value in terms of the state. Our
result is in the direction of Feinstein [15], except that [15] studies the set of the equilibriums
instead of the values.
The main result of this paper is the DPP for the set value, which can be viewed as a
type of time consistency and justifies that the set value is an appropriate object for our
dynamic model. While natural in light of its counterpart in the discrete model, the result
is much more involved in the continuous time model and requires several approximations.
The pathwise setting adds the technical difficulty. As already observed in Section 2, the
pathwise structure is intrinsically needed even in the state dependent setting.
Finally we provide a duality result, motivated by Ma & Yong [27] and Karnam, Ma, &
Zhang [25], which is in the same spirit of the level set approach, see e.g. Barles, Soner, &
Souganidis [3]. We introduce an auxiliary control problem on an enlarged state space, where
the additional state corresponds to the possible values of the game. The value function of
the new control problem is a viscosity solution of a standard path dependent HJB equation,
for which we refer to Ekren, Touzi, & Zhang [11, 12], and Ren, Touzi, & Zhang [35]. Then
the set value of the game is characterized as the nodal set of this new value function. This
approach is related to the viability approach in [9] and is quite efficient in terms of numerical
computation of the set value.
2 The discrete model
In this section we study a discrete model with finite time horizon, introduced in Section 2.2.
The DPP for the set value is similar to Abreu, Pearce, & Stacchetti [1] and is presented in
Section 2.3. The results in Section 2.4 concerning the state dependent case is new, to the
best of our knowledge. The observations in Sections 2.1, 2.5, and 2.6 are interesting but
not surprising in the game literature. We nevertheless present them here because the same
properties hold in the continuous time model in the next section, but it is easier for the
readers to include them in this section.
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2.1 A static game
In this subsection we consider a simple static game with N players, and present some basic
observations about Nash equilibriums. Player i’s control takes values in a Borel measurable
set Ai in some arbitrary topological space. For a = (a1, · · · , aN ) ∈ A := A1 × · · · × AN ,
Ji(a) is the player i’s cost function she seeks to minimize, and J := (J1, · · · , JN ) : A→ RN .
We say a∗ ∈ A is a Nash equilibrium if:
Ji(a
∗) ≤ Ji(a∗,−i, ai) for all ai ∈ Ai,
where (a∗,−i, ai) is the same as a∗ except that its i-th component is replaced by ai.
Note that there might be multiple equilibriums or no equilibriums. We emphasize that
the non-zero sum game could have different values J(a∗) at different equilibriums a∗, as we
see in Example 2.1 below. We thus introduce the set value of the game:
V :=
{
J(a∗) : for all equilibriums a∗
} ⊂ RN .
Example 2.1 Set N = 2, A1 = A2 = {0, 1}, and J(a) as in Table 1 below. Then the game
has two equilibriums a∗ = (0, 0) and a∗ = (1, 1), and the set value is V = {(0, 1), (1, 0)}.
J(a) a2 = 0 a2 = 1
a1 = 0 (0, 1) (2, 2)
a1 = 1 (3, 3) (1, 0)
Table 1: Costs of static non-zero sum game for Example 2.1
Remark 2.2 The existence of Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed. However, we emphasize
that in this case our set value is still well defined with V = ∅. Moreover, our set value is by
definition unique, even if there are multiple equilibriums.
Remark 2.3 (i) Nash equilibriums may not be Pareto optimal among all controls. Again
set N = 2, A1 = A2 = {0, 1}, and let J(a) be as in the left side of Table 2, then clearly
there is a unique equilibrium a∗ = (1, 1) with value J(a∗) = (3, 3). However, we note
that Ji(0, 0) = 1 < 3 = Ji(a
∗) for both i = 1, 2.
(ii) In general the comparison principle does not hold for the game value. Consider the
J˜ in the right side of Table 2. There is a unique equilibrium a˜∗ = (0, 0) with value
J˜(a˜∗) = (2, 2). Note that Ji(a) < J˜i(a) for all a ∈ A and i = 1, 2, but Ji(a∗) = 3 >
2 = J˜i(a˜
∗) for both i = 1, 2.
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J(a) a2 = 0 a2 = 1
a1 = 0 (1, 1) (4, 0)
a1 = 1 (0, 4) (3, 3)
J˜(a) a2 = 0 a2 = 1
a1 = 0 (2, 2) (5, 5)
a1 = 1 (5, 5) (6, 6)
Table 2: Costs of static non-zero sum games for Remark 2.3
2.2 The set value in a dynamic setting
We now consider a dynamic setting. In this section we assume both the time and the
state are discrete. Let T := {0, 1, · · · , T} denote the set of discrete times, and for each
t ∈ T, St the set of discrete states at t with |St| < ∞. For the reason we will explain in
Subsection 2.4 below, we shall consider a path dependent setting: ST :=
{
x = (x0, · · · ,xT ) :
xt ∈ St, t ∈ T
}
. Set Ω := ST as the sample space, F := 2Ω, Xt : Ω → St the canonical
process: Xt(x) = xt, and F = {Ft}0≤t≤T = FX the natural filtration generated by X.
Clearly all the functions involved will be F-measurable. Throughout this section, all the
time dependent functions ϕ will be required to be adapted in the sense that ϕ(t,x) depends
only on (t,x0, · · · ,xt). We shall denote
x =t x˜ if xs = x˜s for all s = 0, · · · , t, and STt,x := {x˜ ∈ ST : x˜ =t x}.
There are N players, where the set of admissible controls Ai of the i-th player consists
of adapted mappings αi : T×ST → Ai. Denote A := A1×· · ·×AN and α := (α1, · · · , αN ).
For any (t,x, a) ∈ T× ST×A, q(t,x, a; ·) : St+1 → (0, 1] is a transition probability function:∑
x∈St+1 q(t,x, a;x) = 1. Let P
t,x,α denote the probability measure such that:
P
t,x,α(X =t x) = 1, and
P
t,x,α
(
Xs+1 = x|X =s x˜
)
= q
(
s, x˜, α(s, x˜);x
) ∀ s ≥ t, x˜ ∈ STt,x, x ∈ Ss+1.
Now for i = 1, · · · , N , let gi : ST → R and fi := T×ST×Ai → R be adapted and measurable
in ai ∈ Ai (the measurability in (t,x) is trivial since the space T × ST is finite). The i-th
player’s cost function is defined as:
Ji(t,x, α) := E
Pt,x,α
[
gi(X) +
T−1∑
s=t
fi(s,X, αi(s,X))
]
.
We shall always denote
J(t,x, α) :=
(
J1(t,x, α), · · · , JN (t,x, α)
) ∈ RN .
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Definition 2.4 Fix (t,x) ∈ T × ST. We say α∗ ∈ A is a Nash equilibrium of the game at
(t,x), denoted as α∗ ∈ NE(t,x), if, for each i = 1, · · · , N ,
Ji(t,x, α
∗) ≤ Ji(t,x, α∗,−i, αi) for all αi ∈ Ai.
As we saw in Example 2.1, the game could have different values J(t,x, α∗) at different
equilibriums α∗. Our main object is the following set value over all equilibriums:
V(t,x) :=
{
J(t,x, α∗) : α∗ ∈ NE(t,x)} ⊂ RN ,
which is the counterpart of the value function in the standard control literature. As men-
tioned in Remark 2.2, V(t,x) always exists (with possible value ∅) and is by nature unique.
Remark 2.5 For the ease of presentation in this section we restrict to the case |St| < ∞,
but all the results can be easily extended to the case that St is countable. When St is
uncountable, although intuitively the results will still hold true, we will encounter some
very subtle measurability issue, as we will see in the next section.
Remark 2.6 For two person zero sum games under the Isaacs condition and other technical
conditions, even if there are multiple equilibriums, their values J will always be the same,
namely V(t,x) = {V (t,x)} is a singleton, and in the continuous time setting the value
function V would satisfy a (path dependent) Isaacs equation.
We also remark that, by considering mixed strategies, the Isaacs condition will always
hold (under very mild conditions), see e.g. Mertens, Sorin, & Zamir [28] for discrete time
models and Buckdahn, Li, & Quincampoix [7] for continuous time models, and hence the
set value for these zero sum games is a singleton. It will be interesting to study the set
value of nonzero sum games under mixed strategies, which we leave for future research.
We note that, although ST is finite, unless we assume A is also finite, in general V(t,x)
may not be finite. The following basic property is interesting in its own right.
Proposition 2.7 If q, f are continuous in a and A is compact, then V(t,x) is compact.
Proof Under our assumption g(x) and f(t,x, a) are bounded, and thus obviously V(t,x)
is bounded. Now let yn = J(t,x, α
∗
n) ∈ V(t,x) for some α∗n ∈ NE(t,x) and yn → y. Since
A is compact, for any (s, x˜) ∈ T× ST, {α∗n(s, x˜)}n≥1 have a convergent subsequence. Note
further that ST is finite, then without loss of generality we may assume there exists α∗ ∈ A
such that α∗n(s, x˜)→ α∗(s, x˜) for all (s, x˜) ∈ T× ST. Now for any i and αi ∈ Ai, we have
Ji(t,x, α
∗
n) ≤ Ji(t,x, α∗,−in , αi).
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By the continuity of q and f in α, one can easily check that Ji(t,x, α
∗
n) → Ji(t,x, α∗),
Ji(t,x, α
∗,−i
n , αi) → Ji(t,x, α∗,−i, αi). Then Ji(t,x, α∗) ≤ Ji(t,x, α∗,−i, αi). This implies
α∗ ∈ NE(t,x), thus y = J(t,x, α∗) ∈ V(t,x). So V(t,x) is closed and hence compact.
2.3 Dynamic programming principle for the set value
Given an F-stopping time τ and an Fτ -measurable function ψ : ST → RN (namely ψ(x) =
ψ(xτ(x)∧·)), consider the game with terminal time τ and terminal condition ψ:
Ji(τ, ψ; t,x, α) := E
Pt,x,α
[
ψi(X) +
τ−1∑
s=t
fi
(
s,X, αi(s,X)
)]
.
Define the equilibrium at (τ, ψ; t,x) in the obvious way and denote its set NE(τ, ψ; t,x).
Our main result of this section is the following dynamic programming principle.
Theorem 2.8 For any (t,x) ∈ T× ST and any F-stopping time τ with τ(x) > t,
V(t,x) =
{
J(τ, ψ; t,x, α∗) : for all ψ and α∗ satisfying
ψ(x˜) ∈ V(τ(x˜), x˜),∀x˜ ∈ STt,x, and α∗ ∈ NE(τ, ψ; t,x)
}
.
(2.1)
Proof Let V˜(t,x) denote the right side of (2.1).
Step 1. We first prove ⊂. For any y = J(t,x, α∗) ∈ V(t,x) with α∗ ∈ NE(t,x), denote
ψ(x˜) := J(τ(x˜), x˜, α∗), for all x˜ ∈ STt,x.
Now for any i and αi ∈ Ai, denote α˜i := αi1{s<τ} + α∗i 1{s≥τ} ∈ Ai. Then
Ji(τ, ψ; t,x, α
∗,−i, αi) = EP
t,x,α∗,−i,αi
[
ψi(X) +
τ−1∑
s=t
fi(s,X, αi(s,X))
]
= EP
t,x,α∗,−i,α˜i
[
gi(X) +
T−1∑
s=t
fi(s,X, α˜i(s,X))
]
= Ji(t,x, α
∗,−i, α˜i).
By setting αi = α
∗
i we also have Ji(τ, ψ; t,x, α
∗) = Ji(t,x, α∗). Since α∗ ∈ NE(t,x), then
Ji(τ, ψ; t,x, α
∗,−i, αi) ≥ Ji(τ, ψ; t,x, α∗). That is, α∗ ∈ NE(τ, ψ; t,x).
Moreover, for any x˜ ∈ STt,x, denote
αˆi(s, xˆ) := αi(s, xˆ)1{s≥τ(x˜)}∩{xˆ =τ(x˜) x˜} + α
∗
i (s, xˆ)1({s≥τ(x˜)}∩{xˆ =τ(x˜) x˜})c ∈ Ai. (2.2)
Similarly we have
0 ≤ Ji(t,x, α∗,−i, αˆi)− Ji(t,x, α∗)
= Pt,x,α
∗
(X =τ(x˜) x˜)
[
Ji(τ(x˜), x˜, α
∗,−i, αi)− ψi(x˜)
]
.
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Note that q > 0 and thus Pt,x,α
∗
(X =τ(x˜) x˜) > 0. This implies that α
∗ ∈ NE(τ(x˜), x˜), then
ψ(x˜) ∈ V(τ(x˜), x˜). Therefore, it follows from (2.1) that y ∈ V˜(t,x).
Step 2. On the other hand, let y = J(τ, ψ; t,x, α∗) ∈ V˜(t,x) for some desired ψ and α∗.
For each x˜ ∈ STt,x, we have ψ(x˜) ∈ V(τ(x˜), x˜) and thus there exists α∗x˜ ∈ NE(τ(x˜), x˜) such
that ψ(x˜) = J(τ(x˜), x˜, α∗
x˜
). Define
αˆ∗(s, xˆ) := α∗(s, xˆ)1{s<τ(xˆ)} +
∑
x˜∈ST
α∗
x˜
(s, xˆ)1{s≥τ(xˆ)}∩{x˜=τ(xˆ)xˆ} ∈ A.
Note that τ(x˜) = τ(xˆ) when x˜ =τ(xˆ) xˆ. Then, for any i and any αi ∈ Ai, denoting
α˜i := αi1{s<τ} + αˆ∗1{s≥τ} ∈ Ai,
Ji(t,x, αˆ
∗,−i, αi)− Ji(t,x, αˆ∗)
= Ji(t,x, αˆ
∗,−i, αi)− Ji(t,x, αˆ∗,−i, α˜i) + Ji(t,x, αˆ∗,−i, α˜i)− Ji(t,x, αˆ∗)
=
∑
x˜∈ST
P
t,x,α∗,−i,αi(X =τ(x˜) x˜)
[
Ji(τ(x˜), x˜, α
∗,−i
x˜
, αi)− Ji(τ(x˜), x˜, α∗x˜)
]
+Ji(τ, ψ; t,x, α
∗,−i, αi)− Ji(τ, ψ; t,x, α∗)
≥ 0.
This implies αˆ∗ ∈ NE(t,x), and thus y = Ji(t,x, αˆ∗) ∈ V(t,x).
Remark 2.9 The condition q > 0, implying that Pt,x,α are all equivalent for different α,
seems crucial in the proof of Theorem 2.8. This condition is also used in [1] and is interpreted
as that no player can infer the other players’ controls through the observed state process.
When q is only nonnegative, we can prove the partial DPP: V˜(t,x) ⊂ V(t,x), where
V˜(t,x) again denotes the right side of (2.1), and the inclusion could be strict. However,
when the measures are singular, it is too strong to require ψ(x˜) ∈ V(τ, x˜) for all x˜ ∈ STt,x. It
will be very interesting to see if it is possible to weaken this requirement in an appropriate
way so that the DPP will hold true.
Remark 2.10 It is crucial that the control is closed loop: α = α(X·). If one uses open loop
controls, then DPP typically fails even for zero-sum games. See Buckdahn’s counterexample
in Pham & Zhang [32] in a continuous time setting, see also Possamai, Touzi, & Zhang [33,
Remark 4.4(ii)]. Below we present a counterexample in the discrete time setting.
We recall that open loop controls do not depend on the state X. In this case, the value
of X, instead of its distribution, will depend on the control.
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Example 2.11 Consider a two player game with open loop controls as follows. Fix a
probability space (Ω,F ,P). Set T := {t0, t1, t2} := {0, 1, 2}, ξ1, ξ2 are independent one
dimensional random variables with E[ξi] = 0, V ar(ξi) = 1, the filtration is F = {Ftj}j=0,1,2
with Ft0 := {∅,Ω}, Ft1 := σ(ξ1), Ft2 := σ(ξ1, ξ2), the controls α = (α1, α2) are F-adapted
and take values in A1 = A2 := R, the state process is: for some constant σ ≥ 0,
Xαt0 := 0, X
α
t1
:= α1t0 + α
2
t0
+ σξ1, X
α
t2
:= [α1t1 + α
2
t1
]Xt1 + σξ2,
and the cost functions are: gi(x) := −x, fi(t1, a) := 12 |a|2, fi(t0, a) := 4|a|2 + 2a, that is,
Ji(t0, 0, α) := E
[1
2
|αit1 |2 + 4|αit0 |2 + 2αit0 −Xαt2
]
, i = 1, 2.
We note that the game is symmetric for the two players. However, DPP fails for this game:
V(t0, 0) =
{(− 3
2
[|σ|2 + 1], − 3
2
[|σ|2 + 1])},
V˜(t0, 0) =
{(− [3
2
|σ|2 + 4], − [3
2
|σ|2 + 4]
}
.
(2.3)
We note that, when σ = 0, the above game is deterministic.
We first show that the two period game has a unique equilibrium: α∗,it0 = −12 , α∗,it1 =
σξ1 − 1, i = 1, 2. Then Ji(t0, 0, α∗) = −32 [|σ|2 + 1] and thus we obtain the V(t0, 0) in (2.3).
Indeed, assume α∗ is an arbitrary equilibrium. Fix α∗,2. Note that
J1(t0, 0, α
1, α∗,2) = E
[1
2
|α1t1 |2 + 4|α1t0 |2 + 2α1t0 − [α1t1 + α∗,2t1 ][α1t0 + α∗,2t0 + σξ1]
]
.
One can easily see that the unique optimal α1t1 satisfies: α
∗,1
t1
= α1t0 + α
∗,2
t0
+ σξ1. Then
J1(t0, 0, α
1
t0
, α∗,1t1 , α
∗,2) = E
[
4|α1t0 |2 + 2α1t0 −
1
2
[α1t0 + α
∗,2
t0
+ σξ1]
2 − α∗,2t1 [α1t0 + α∗,2t0 + σξ1]
]
.
This is strictly convex in α1t0 . By the first order condition we have:
0 = E
[
8α∗,1t0 + 2− [α∗,1t0 + α∗,2t0 + σξ1]− α∗,2t1
]
= 7α∗,1t0 + 2− α∗,2t0 − E[α∗,2t1 ].
Similarly, we have α∗,2t1 = α
∗,2
t0
+ α∗,1t0 + σξ1. Then E[α
∗,2
t1
] = α∗,2t0 + α
∗,1
t0
, and thus
0 = 7α∗,1t0 + 2− α∗,2t0 − [α∗,2t0 + α∗,1t0 ] = 6α∗,1t0 − 2α∗,2t0 + 2.
Similarly we have 6α∗,2t0 − 2α∗,1t0 + 2 = 0. Then one can easily obtain: α∗,1t0 = α∗,2t0 = −12 .
This implies that α∗,1t1 = α
∗,2
t1
= σξ1 − 1.
We next compute V˜(t0, 0). Note that
Ji(t1, x, αt1) = E
[1
2
|αit1 |2 − [α1t1 + α2t1 ]x− ξ2
]
= E
[1
2
|αit1 |2 − [α1t1 + α2t1 ]x
]
.
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For fixed x, one can easily see that the unique equilibrium is α˜∗,1t1 = α˜
∗,2
t1
= x (which, for
fixed x, is deterministic and hence is an open loop control for the game at the second period).
Then Ji(t1, x, α˜
∗
t1
) = −32x2 and thus V(t1, x) = {(−32x2,−32x2)}. Now consider the game at
the first period with terminal ψ(x) := (−32x2,−32x2):
Ji(t1, ψ; t0, 0, αt0) = E
[
4|αit0 |2 + 2αit0 −
3
2
[α1t0 + α
2
t0
+ σξ1]
2
]
.
By first order conditions we see that the equilibrium satisfies:
8α˜∗,it0 + 2− 3[α˜∗,1t0 + α˜∗,2t0 ] = 0, i = 1, 2.
This implies that α˜∗,1t0 = α˜
∗,2
t0
= −1, then Ji(t1, ψ; t0, 0, α˜∗t0) = −[32 |σ|2 + 4].
Remark 2.12 Motivated by the mean field equilibriums, we call an equilibrium α∗ at (t,x)
symmetric if α∗,1 = · · · = α∗,N . Denote
Vsymmetric(t,x) := {J(t,x, α∗) : for all symmetric equilibriums α∗}.
Then following the same arguments Vsymmetric also satisfies DPP:
Vsymmetric(t,x) =
{
J(τ, ψ; t,x, α∗) : for all ψ and α∗ such that α∗ is a symmetric
equilibrium at (τ, ψ; t,x) and ψ(x˜) ∈ Vsymmetric(τ(x˜), x˜) for all x˜ ∈ STt,x
}
.
2.4 The state dependent case
In this subsection we consider a state dependent (i.e., Markovian) model:
q(t,x, a;x) = q(t,xt, a;x), g(x) = g(xT ), fi(t,x, a) = fi(t,xt, a). (2.4)
We shall call a function ϕ on T× ST state dependent if ϕ(t,x) = ϕ(t, x˜) whenever xt = x˜t,
and in this case it is natural to abuse the notation and denote it as ϕ(t,xt).
We first remark that, in this case we may still have path dependent equilibriums, whose
value is different from those of state dependent equilibriums.
Example 2.13 Set T = 3, N = 2, A1 = A2 = {0, 1}, and ST takes values as in Figure 1.
That is, S0 = {s0}, S1 = {s10, s11}, S2 = {s2}, S3 = {s30, s31}. For the first two periods
and for g, we set
f(0, ·) = f(1, ·) = 0, q(0, ·) = 1
2
, q(1, ·) = 1, g(s30) = (1, 1), g(s31) = (0, 0),
11
s11 s31
St: s0 s2
s10 s30
Figure 1: States for Example 2.13
Then the game at (0, s0) does not depend on α(0, ·) and α(1, ·). Indeed,
J(0, s0, α) =
1
2
[
J¯(α(2, (s0, s10, s2))) + J¯(α(2, (s0, s11, s2)))
]
,
where J¯i(a) = fi(2, s2, ai) + q(2, s2, a; s30), i = 1, 2.
(2.5)
Let us assume that the game for J¯(a), which corresponds to the last period of the original
game, has two equilibriums a∗ and a˜∗. Then we may construct a path dependent equilibrium:
noting that X0 ≡ s0 and X2 ≡ s2 are deterministic,
α∗(2,X) := a∗1{X1=s10} + a˜
∗1{X1=s11}. (2.6)
For this purpose, we set f(2, s2, a) and q(2, s2, a; s30) for a ∈ A as in Table 3. Then by
(2.5) we see that 4J¯ is the same as Table 1, and thus there are two equilibriums a∗ = (0, 0)
and a˜∗ = (1, 1), with corresponding values J¯(a∗) = (0, 14) and J¯(a˜
∗) = (14 , 0).
f(2, s2, a) a2 = 0 a2 = 1
a1 = 0 (−14 , 0) (−14 ,−14 )
a1 = 1 (0, 0) (0,−14 )
q(2, s2, a; s30) a2 = 0 a2 = 1
a1 = 0
1
4
3
4
a1 = 1
3
4
1
4
Table 3: Cost matrices and transition probabilities for Example 2.13
We now come back to the original game J(0, s0, α). Note that, by (2.5), the only relevant
control is α(2, (s0,X1, s2)). If α is state dependent, then α(2, (s0,X1, s2)) = α(2, s2) is de-
terministic. This implies J(0, s0, α) = J¯(α(2, s2)), and thus there are only two equilibriums
with values (0, 14) and (
1
4 , 0). However, we can construct a path dependent equilibrium α
∗
by (2.6), whose corresponding value is: J(0, s0, α
∗) = 12 J¯(a
∗) + 12 J¯(a˜
∗) = (18 ,
1
8).
In view of Example 2.13, nevertheless, V is still state dependent if we restrict to the
state dependent model (2.4).
Proposition 2.14 Under (2.4), V(t,x) = V(t,xt) is state dependent.
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Proof Assume xt = x
′
t. For any α ∈ A and x˜′ ∈ STt,x′ , introduce α′ by α′(s, x˜′) := α(s, x˜)
where x˜s := xs1{s≤t} + x˜′s1{s>t}. Then one can easily check that J(t,x, α) = J(t,x′, α′).
Such correspondence is one to one and thus it is clear that V(t,x) = V(t,x′).
From now on, in the state dependent case, we may write the set value as V(t, x). The
following DPP is an immediate consequence of Theorem 2.8.
Corollary 2.15 Under (2.4), for any (t,x) ∈ T× ST and F-stopping time τ with τ(x) ≥ t,
V(t, x) =
{
J(τ, ψ; t,x, α∗) : for all ψ,α∗,x such that xt = x,
ψ(x˜) ∈ V(τ(x˜), x˜τ(x˜)) for all x˜ ∈ STt,x, and α∗ ∈ NE(τ, ψ; t,x)
}
.
We emphasize that, although our model is state dependent here, the DPP above involves
path dependent ψ and α∗. In fact, if we restrict to state dependent functions ψ and/or
α∗, then the DPP may fail, as we explain next. For simplicity, below we consider only
deterministic time: τ ≡ T0 for some T0 > t.
We first investigate the case that ψ is state dependent but α∗ can be still path dependent.
In this case by Corollary 2.15 the following partial DPP is obvious:
V(t, x) ⊃
{
J(T0, ψ; t,x, α
∗) : for all state dependent ψ and α∗ ∈ A, x ∈ ST
such that xt = x, ψ(x˜) ∈ V(T0, x˜),∀x˜ ∈ ST0 , and α∗ ∈ NE(T0, ψ; t,x)
}
.
(2.7)
However, the above inclusion can be strict.
Example 2.16 Consider Example 2.13 and set T0 = 2. By Example 2.13, we see that
V(2, s2) =
{
J¯(a∗), J¯(a˜∗)
}
=
{
(0,
1
4
), (
1
4
, 0)
}
.
If ψ is state dependent, then there are only two possible functions: ψ1(s2) = (0,
1
4 ) and
ψ2(s2) = (
1
4 , 0). Recalling that f(0, ·) = f(1, ·) = 0, then J(T0, ψ; 0, s0, α) = ψ(s2) for all
α. Thus the right side of (2.7) is
{
(0, 14), (
1
4 , 0)
}
. However, by Example 2.13 we know that
V(0, s0) contains at least one more value (
1
8 ,
1
8).
We next investigate the case that both ψ and α ∈ A are state dependent, then obviously
J(t,x, α) and J(T0, ψ; t,x, α) are also state dependent. Define
Astate := {α ∈ A : α is state dependent};
Vstate(t, x) := {J(t, x, α∗) : α∗ ∈ Astate is an equilibrium among all α ∈ Astate}.
We emphasize that here all controls are required to be state dependent, in particular, the
above α∗ ∈ Astate may not be an equilibrium among all controls α ∈ A. Consequently,
Vstate(t, x) may not be a subset of V(t, x). Again, Vstate does not satisfy the DPP.
13
Proposition 2.17 Under (2.4), Vstate satisfies a partial DPP:
Vstate(t, x) ⊂
{
J(T0, ψ; t, x, α
∗) : for all state dependent ψ and α∗ ∈ Astate s.t.
ψ(x˜) ∈ Vstate(T0, x˜), ∀x˜ ∈ ST0, and α∗ is an equilibrium in Astate at (T0, ψ; t, x)
}
,
(2.8)
but the inclusion could be strict.
We remark that the inclusions in (2.7) and (2.8) have opposite directions.
Proof Let V˜state(t, x) denote the right side of (2.8). We shall prove Vstate ⊂ V˜state, and
see Example 2.18 below that Vstate 6= V˜state. We follow the arguments in Theorem 2.8 Step
1 and proceed in two steps.
Step 1. Let α∗ ∈ Astate be an equilibrium in Astate at (t, x). Denote
ψ(x˜) := J(T0, x˜, α
∗), for all x˜ ∈ ST0 .
For any i and αi ∈ Astate,i, note that α˜i := αi1{s<T0} + α∗i 1{s≥T0} is also in Astate,i. Then
following the same arguments as in Theorem 2.8 Step 1 we see that α∗ is an equilibrium in
Astate at (T0, ψ; t, x).
Step 2. It remains to show that ψ(x˜) ∈ Vstate(T0, x˜) for all x˜ ∈ ST0 . That is,
Ji(T0, x˜, α
∗,−i, αi) ≥ Ji(T0, x˜, α∗), for all i, all x˜ ∈ ST0 , and all αi ∈ Astate,i. (2.9)
We emphasize that the αˆi constructed in (2.2) is not in Astate,i, even when the α∗ and αi
there are state dependent, so a more careful argument is required. We shall prove (2.9) by
backward induction on T0.
First, if T0 = T − 1, then the counterpart of (2.2) becomes: for any fixed x˜ ∈ ST0 ,
αˆi(s, xˆ) := αi(s, x˜)1{s=T0}∩{xˆ=x˜} + α
∗
i (s, xˆ)1{s<T0}∪{xˆ 6=x˜},
which is in Astate,i. Then (2.9) follows from the same arguments in Theorem 2.8 Step 1.
Assume (2.9) holds true for T0 + 1. Now for T0, note that
Ji(T0, x˜, α
∗,−i, αi)
= fi(T0, x˜, αi(T0, x˜)) +
∑
xˆ∈ST0+1
q(T0, x˜, (α
∗,−i, αi)(T0, x˜), xˆ)Ji(T0 + 1, xˆ, α∗,−i, αi)
≥ fi(T0, x˜, αi(T0, x˜)) +
∑
xˆ∈ST0+1
q(T0, x˜, (α
∗,−i, αi)(T0, x˜), xˆ)Ji(T0 + 1, xˆ, α∗), (2.10)
where the last inequality is due to the induction assumption. Fix x˜ ∈ ST0 and define
αˆi(s, xˆ) := αi(s, xˆ)1{s=T0}∩{xˆ=x˜} + α
∗
i (s, xˆ)1{s 6=T0}∪{xˆ 6=x˜},
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which is again state dependent. Then, denoting Pt,x,α in the obvious way,
0 ≤ Ji(t, x, α∗,−i, αˆi)− Ji(t, x, α∗) = Pt,x,α∗(XT0 = x˜)×[
fi(T0, x˜, αi(T0, x˜)) +
∑
xˆ∈ST0+1
q(T0, x˜, (α
∗,−i, αi)(T0, x˜), xˆ)Ji(T0 + 1, xˆ, α∗)
−fi(T0, x˜, α∗i (T0, x˜))−
∑
xˆ∈ST0+1
q(T0, x˜, α
∗(T0, x˜), xˆ)Ji(T0 + 1, xˆ, α∗)
]
.
Note that Pt,x,αˆ
∗
(XT0 = x˜) > 0. Then, together with (2.10), the above implies
Ji(T0, x˜, α
∗,−i, αi) ≥ fi(T0, x˜, α∗i (T0, x˜))−
∑
xˆ∈ST0+1
q(T0, x˜, α
∗(T0, x˜), xˆ)Ji(T0 + 1, xˆ, α∗)
= Ji(T0, x˜, α
∗).
This proves (2.9), hence (2.8).
We now construct a counterexample such that the inclusion in (2.8) is strict. This is
again due to the non-uniqueness of equilibriums.
Example 2.18 Let T = 4, N = 2, A1 = A2 = {0, 1}, and ST takes values as in Figure 2.
s11 s21 s41
St: s0 s3
s10 s20 s40
Figure 2: States for Example 2.18
We shall construct an equilibrium whose value is in V˜state(0, s0)\Vstate(0, s0). Set
T0 = 1, q(0, ·) = 1
2
, f(0, ·) = 0.
Given a desired ψ, for any α ∈ Astate, clearly J(1, ψ; 0, s0 , α) = 12 [ψ(s10)+ψ(s11)], and thus
V˜state(0, s0) =
{1
2
[ψ(s10) + ψ(s11)] : for all ψ s.t. ψ(s1i) ∈ Vstate(1, s1i), i = 0, 1
}
. (2.11)
Note that Vstate(1, s10) and Vstate(1, s11) are two different three-period games. Let the (3-
period) subgames at branch X1 = s10 and at branch X1 = s11 exactly as in Example 2.13.
Since we consider only α ∈ Astate, by (2.5) we have
J(1, s1i, α) = J¯(α(3, s3)), i = 0, 1.
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Then, by Example 2.13,
Vstate(1, s10) = Vstate(1, s11) =
{
(0,
1
4
), (
1
4
, 0)
}
,
with corresponding equilibriums α(3, s3) = (0, 0) and α(3, s3) = (1, 1) (the other values of
α(t,x) is irrelevant, or say, can be arbitrary). Then, by (2.11),
V˜state(0, s0) =
{
(0,
1
4
), (
1
4
, 0), (
1
8
,
1
8
)
}
.
On the other hand, since q(0, ·) = 12 and f(0, ·) = 0, for any α ∈ Astate we have
J(0, s0, α) =
1
2
[J(1, s10, α) + J(1, s11, α)] = J¯(α(3, s3)).
So Vstate(0, s0) = {(0, 14), (14 , 0)}, therefore, (18 , 18) ∈ V˜state(0, s0)\Vstate(0, s0).
2.5 Pareto equilibriums
For y, y˜ ∈ RN . We say y ≤ y˜ if yi ≤ y˜i for i = 1, · · · , N , and y < y˜ if we assume further
that yi < y˜i for some i. As we saw in Remark 2.3 (ii), for a non-zero sum game typically the
comparison principle fails in the sense: for equilibriums α∗, α˜∗ for games J, J˜ , respectively,
J(α) ≤ J˜(α) for all α, but J(α∗) > J˜(α˜∗).
A consequence of the above property is that DPP would fail, in general, if one restricts
to the so called Pareto equilibriums.
Definition 2.19 We say α∗ ∈ NE(t,x) is a Pareto equilibrium if there does not exist
another equilibrium α˜ ∈ NE(t,x) such that J(t,x, α˜) < J(t,x, α∗).
Define
VPareto(t,x) := {J(t,x, α∗) : for all Pareto equilibriums α∗ ∈ NE(t,x)}.
As the following example show, even the partial DPPs fail in general:
VPareto(t,x) 6=
{
J(T0, ψ; t,x, α
∗) : for all ψ and α∗ such that
ψ(x˜) ∈ VPareto(T0, x˜),∀x˜ ∈ STt,x, and α∗ is a Pareto equilibrium at (T0, ψ; t,x)
}
.
(2.12)
Example 2.20 As usual let V˜Pareto(t,x) denote the right side of (2.12). Let T = 2, N = 2,
A1 = A2 = {0, 1}, and ST takes values as in Figure 3.
We first consider the subgame V(1,x). Set
g(x)|x2=s21 = (0, 0).
16
s13
s12 s21
St: s0
s11 s20
s10
Figure 3: States for Example 2.20
Let f(1, x) := f(1, (s0, x), a) (independent of a), g(x) := g(s0, x, s20), and q(1, x, a) :=
q(1,x, a; s20) (independent of x) be as in Table 4. Then J(1, x, a) := J(1, (s0, x), a) are as
in Table 5. This implies that
V(1,x) = {ψ∗(x1), ψ˜∗(x1)}, VPareto(1,x) = {ψ∗(x1)},
where ψ∗ and ψ˜∗ are given in Table 6.
x s10 s11 s12 s13
f(1, x) (1, 1) (−4, 4) (4, -4) (1,1)
g(x) (4, 4) (20, 4) (4, 20) (12, 12)
q(1, a) a2 = 0 a2 = 1
a1 = 0
1
2
3
4
a1 = 1
3
4
1
4
Table 4: Cost and transition functions for Example 2.20
J(1, s10, a) a2 = 0 a2 = 1
a1 = 0 (3, 3) (4, 4)
a1 = 1 (4, 4) (2, 2)
J(1, s11, a) a2 = 0 a2 = 1
a1 = 0 (6, 6) (11, 7)
a1 = 1 (11, 7) (1, 5)
J(1, s12, a) a2 = 0 a2 = 1
a1 = 0 (6, 6) (7, 11)
a1 = 1 (7, 11) (5, 1)
J(1, s11, a) a2 = 0 a2 = 1
a1 = 0 (7, 7) (10, 10)
a1 = 1 (10, 10) (4, 4)
Table 5: Cost matrices for Example 2.20
We now consider J(1, ψ; 0, s0, α) for ψ = ψ
∗, ψ˜∗. Fix some ε > 0 small enough. Set
f(0, ·) = (0, 0), q(0, s0, a; s1j) = 1− 3ε if j = I(a) and q(0, s0, a; s1j) = ε if j 6= I(a),
where
I(0, 0) = 0, I(1, 0) = 1, I(0, 1) = 2, I(1, 1) = 3.
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x s10 s11 s12 s13
ψ∗(x) (2, 2) (1, 5) (5, 1) (4,4)
ψ˜∗(x) (3, 3) (6, 6) (6, 6) (7, 7)
Table 6: Values of the game in Example 2.20 at time 1
and all other q(0, s0, a;x) = ε. Then
J(1, ψ; 0, s0, a) =
3∑
j=0
q(0, s0, a; s1j)ψ(s1j) = ψ(s1I(a)) +O(ε).
That is, J(1, ψ; 0, s0, a) is approximately equal to ψ(s1I(a)) and, when ε is small enough, the
two subgames have the same equilibrium. In particular, recall the J and J˜ in Example 2.20,
we see that
J(1, ψ∗; 0, s0, a) = J(a) +O(ε), J(1, ψ˜∗; 0, s0, a) = J˜(a) +O(ε).
Then, by Theorem 2.8,
V˜Pareto(0, s0) = {(4, 4) +O(ε)}, V(0, s0) = {(3, 3) +O(ε), (4, 4) +O(ε)},
and thus VPareto(0, s0) = {(3, 3)+O(ε)}. This implies that V˜Pareto(0, s0) and VPareto(0, s0)
do not include each other, namely partial DPP fails in both directions.
Remark 2.21 We emphasize that in Definition 2.19 a Pareto equilibrium α∗ is only com-
pared to other equilibriums. In general it is possible that there exists another control α ∈ A
(not an equilibrium) such that J(t,x, α) < J(t,x, α∗), see Remark 2.3 (i). We may call an
equilibrium α∗ ∈ A a strong Pareto equilibrium if there is no such control α ∈ A. Denote
V
strong
Pareto(t,x) := {J(t,x, α∗) : for all strong Pareto equilibriums α∗}.
In general DPP fails for VstrongPareto too.
2.6 Optimal equilibriums
We now fix x0 ∈ S0 and consider V(0, x0). In practice it is important to determine which
equilibrium to implement. For this purpose we introduce a central planner, and assume the
central planner is interested in minimizing:
V0 := inf
y∈V(0,x0)
N∑
i=1
λiyi = inf
{ N∑
i=1
λiJi(0, x0, α
∗) : α∗ ∈ NE(0, x0)
}
. (2.13)
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where λi ≥ 0 with
∑N
i=1 λi = 1. Such problems are natural, say, for social welfares. By
Proposition 2.7, the problem (2.13) has an optimizer y∗ ∈ V(0, x0), and correspondingly
there exists α∗ ∈ NE(0, x0). Note that, when λi > 0 for all i, such α∗ is automatically a
Pareto equilibrium. We remark that in general neither y∗ nor α∗ is unique, however, the
central planer is indifferent to them and thus can pick an arbitrary one. More importantly,
in practice it is quite easy to implement such an equilibrium, as we explain below.
Remark 2.22 (i) Assume the central planner picks an optimal equilibrium α∗ and rec-
ommend it to the players. As long as each player believes the others would follow the
recommended one, it is in his/her best interest to follow the same α∗ since it is an
equilibrium. Moreover, since α∗ is a Pareto optimal one (assuming λi > 0 for all i),
the players are unlikely to make a collective decision to choose a different equilibrium.
(ii) The problem is quite different from a “dictatorship” scenario, where the dictator wants
to minimize
V˜0 := inf
α∈A
N∑
i=1
λiJi(0, x0, α).
Assume the problem V˜0 has an optimal argument α˜
∗ and the dictator forces the players
to follow it. However, since α˜∗ is (in general) not an equilibrium, the individual players
have no incentive to follow it even if they believe the others would do so. Consequently,
the dictator has to use regulation/penalty (or other means) to force them to implement
this strategy, which adds to the social cost.
Remark 2.23 Since DPP fails for the Pareto equilibriums as detailed in Section 2.5, the
dynamic version of (2.13) will generally be time inconsistent. In particular, this implies
that there need not, and typically will not, exist a moving scalarization (a moving objective
parameterized by an adapted process λ) as in Feinstein & Rudloff [16] so that α∗ is a
consistent equilibrium for this problem. Time inconsistency, therefore, implies that though
a central planner may dictate a socially beneficial equilibrium at time 0, at some time t this
may no longer be an optimal equilibrium for the subgame over [t, T ].
3 The continuous time model
In this section we extend our results to a continuous time setting. We shall consider a
diffusion model with drift controls only. In this case all the involved probability measures
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are equivalent. The case with volatility controls may require new insights, especially in light
of Remark 2.9, and is left for future research.
3.1 The nonzero sum game
Let [0, T ] be the time horizon, (Ω,F = {Ft}0≤t≤T ,P0) a filtered probability space, B a d-
dimensional P0-Brownian motion. Consider a game with N players. Let A = A1×· · ·×AN
be a convex domain in a Euclidean space, and A = A1×· · ·×AN the set of F-progressively
measurable A-valued processes. The data of the game satisfy the following basic properties,
where the boundedness assumption is mainly for simplicity.
Assumption 3.1 (b, f) : [0, T ] × Ω × A → Rd × RN are F-progressively measurable and
bounded; and ξ : Ω→ RN is FT -measurable and bounded.
As usual we omit the variable ω in b, f, ξ. For each α ∈ A, define
dPα
dP0
:=MαT := exp
(∫ T
0
b(s, αs) · dBs − 1
2
∫ T
0
|b(s, αs)|2ds
)
.
At time t, each player has the value defined through the conditional expectation:
Ji(t, α) := E
Pα
t
[
ξi +
∫ T
t
fi(s, α
i
s)ds
]
, i = 1, · · · , N.
We remark that we may replace the above expectation with some nonlinear operator through
BSDEs, see Remark 3.16 (ii) below. We say α∗ ∈ A is a Nash equilibrium at t if
Ji(t, α
∗) ≤ Ji(t, α∗,−i, αi), P0-a.s. for all i and all αi ∈ Ai,
and we introduce the set value:
Vt :=
{
J(t, α∗) : for all Nash equilibrium α∗ at t
}
.
We remark that the elements of Vt are Ft-measurable RN -valued random variables, and we
shall consider the localization in RN in the next subsection.
Given T0 and η ∈ L∞(FT0 ;RN ), denote
Ji(T0, η; t, α) := E
Pα
t
[
ηi +
∫ T0
t
fi(s, α
i
s)ds
]
, i = 1, · · · , N,
and we define Nash equilibrium at (T0, η; t) in the obvious way. As such we then have the
following DPP. We remark that this result does not even require the right continuity of F.
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Theorem 3.2 Under Assumption 3.1, for any 0 ≤ t < T0 ≤ T it holds
Vt :=
{
J(T0, η; t, α
∗) : for all η ∈ VT0 and all Nash equilibrium α∗ at (T0, η; t)
}
. (3.1)
Proof Let V˜t denote the right side of (3.1). First, for J(t, α∗) ∈ Vt, denote η := J(T0, α∗).
For any i and αi ∈ Ai, denote αˆi := αi1[0,T0] + α∗1(T0,T ]. It is clear that
Ji(T0, η; t, α
∗,−i, αi) = Ji(t, α∗,−i, αˆi) ≥ Ji(t, α∗) = Ji(T0, η; t, α∗).
That is, α∗ is a Nash equilibrium at (T0, η; t). Moreover, assume by contradiction that η /∈
VT0 , then there exist i and αi ∈ Ai such that P0(Ei) > 0, where Ei := {Ji(T0, α∗,−i, αi) <
Ji(T0, α
∗)}. Denote αˆi := α∗1[0,T0] + 1(T0,T ][αi1Ei + α∗1Eci ]. Then
Ji(t, α
∗,−i, αˆi) = EP
α∗
t
[ ∫ T0
t
fi(s, α
∗,i
s )ds + Ji(T0, α
∗,−i, αi)1Ei + Ji(T0, α
∗)1Ec
i
]
< EP
α∗
t
[ ∫ T0
t
fi(s, α
∗,i
s )ds + Ji(T0, α
∗)
]
= Ji(t, α
∗).
This contradicts with the assumption that α∗ is an equilibrium at t. Thus η ∈ VT0 , and
therefore J(t, α∗) ∈ V˜t.
Next, let J(T0, η; t, α
∗) ∈ V˜t with desired (η, α∗). Since η ∈ VT0 , η = J(T0, α˜∗) for some
equilibrium α˜∗ at T0. Denote αˆ∗ := α∗1[0,T0] + α˜
∗1(T0,T ], and for any i and α
i ∈ Ai, denote
αˆi := αi1[0,T0] + α˜
∗1(T0,T ]. Then
Ji(t, αˆ
∗,−i, αi)− Ji(t, αˆ∗)
=
[
Ji(t, αˆ
∗,−i, αi)− Ji(t, αˆ∗,−i, αˆi)
]
+
[
Ji(t, αˆ
∗,−i, αˆi)− Ji(t, αˆ∗)
]
= EP
αˆ∗,−i,αi
t
[
Ji(T0, α˜
∗,−i, αi)− Ji(T0, α˜∗)
]
+
[
Ji(T0, η; t, α
∗,−i, αi)− Ji(T0, η; t, α∗)
]
.
The second term above is nonnegative by the requirement of α∗. Moreover, note that
Ji(T0, α˜
∗,−i, αi) ≥ Ji(T0, α˜∗), P0-a.s., and Pαˆ∗,−i,αi is equivalent to P0, then Ji(T0, α˜∗,−i, αi) ≥
Ji(T0, α˜
∗), Pαˆ∗,−i,αi-a.s. This implies Ji(t, αˆ∗,−i, αi) ≥ Ji(t, αˆ∗). So α∗ is an equilibrium at
t, and thus J(T0, η; t, α
∗) = J(t, αˆ∗) ∈ Vt.
3.2 The localization
While Theorem 3.2 is quite simple, as mentioned Vt is a set of random variables, rather than
value sets in RN as in Section 2, which is not desirable in applications. In this subsection we
localize the random variables in a pointwise sense. For this purpose it is more convenient
to use the canonical space.
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For the rest of this section, let Ω := {ω ∈ C([0, T ];Rd) : ω0 = 0} be the canonical space,
B the canonical process: Bt(ω) = ωt, P0 the Wiener measure, and F = {Ft}0≤t≤T := FB
the P0-augmented filtration generated by B. Denote
‖ω‖ := sup
0≤t≤T
|ωt|, d((t, ω), (t˜, ω˜)) :=
√
|t− t˜|+ ‖ωt∧· − ω˜t˜∧·‖.
Then (Ω, ‖ ·‖) is a Polish space. For t ∈ [0, T ], ω, ω˜ ∈ Ω, and ξ ∈ L0(FT ), ζ ∈ L0(F), denote
(ω ⊗t ω˜)s := ωs1[0,t](s) + [ωt + ω˜s−t]1[t,T ](s),
ξt,ω(ω˜) := ξ(ω ⊗t ω˜), ζt,ωs (ω˜) := ζt+s(ω ⊗t ω˜).
Let A,A, b, f, ξ be as in the previous subsection. For (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ] × Ω and α ∈ A, define
dPt,ω,α
dP0
:=M t,ω,αT−t := exp
(∫ T−t
0
bt,ω(s,B·, αs) · dBs − 1
2
∫ T−t
0
|bt,ω(s,B·, αs)|2ds
)
;
Ji(t, ω, α) := E
Pt,ω,α
[
ξt,ωi (B·) +
∫ T−t
0
f t,ωi (s,B·, α
i
s)ds
]
, i = 1, · · · , N.
(3.2)
We say α∗ ∈ A is a Nash equilibrium at (t, ω), denoted as α∗ ∈ NE(t, ω), if
Ji(t, ω, α
∗) ≤ Ji(t, ω, α∗,−i, αi), for all i and all αi ∈ Ai,
and we introduce the set value:
V0(t, ω) :=
{
J(t, ω, α∗) : α∗ ∈ NE(t, ω)} ⊂ RN .
Intuitively, η ∈ Vt means η(ω) ∈ V0(t, ω) for P0-a.e. ω. This is indeed true in the setting
of Section 2 if we introduce the corresponding Vt. However, in the continuous time model
we encounter some serious measurability issue. Since the state space Ω is uncountable, the
measurability or even certain regularity of the set value will be required. Note that A is
typically not compact, so the arguments in Proposition 2.7 do not work here. In fact, in
this case neither the (Borel or analytic) measurability of the set V0(t, ω) ⊂ RN for fixed
(t, ω) nor the F-progressive measurability of the mapping (t, ω) → V0(t, ω) is clear to us.
To get around of this difficulty we relax the equilibriums to approximating ones, which are
usually sufficient in practice.
Definition 3.3 We say αε ∈ A is an ε-equilibrium at (t, ω), denoted as αε ∈ NEε(t, ω), if
Ji(t, ω, α
ε) ≤ Ji(t, ω, αε,−i, αi) + ε, for all i and all αi ∈ Ai.
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Denote Oε(y) := {y˜ ∈ RN : |y˜ − y| < ε} ⊂ RN ,and define
V(t, ω) :=
⋂
ε>0
Vε(t, ω) where Vε(t, ω) :=
{
y ∈ Oε(J(t, ω;αε)) : αε ∈ NEε(t, ω)
}
.
Clearly V0(t, ω) ⊂ V(t, ω). Moreover, we have the following simple but important properties.
Proposition 3.4 Let Assumption 3.1 hold.
(i) Vε(t, ω) is bounded and open;
(ii) For any ε′ < ε, the closure cl(Vε′(t, ω)) ⊂ Vε(t, ω);
(iii) V(t, ω) is compact. Moreover, V(t, ω) 6= ∅ whenever NEε(t, ω) 6= ∅ for all ε > 0.
Proof (i) This result is obvious.
(ii) One can easily see that cl(Vε′(t, ω)) ⊂ {y ∈ Oε−ε′(y˜) : y˜ ∈ Vε′(t, ω)} ⊂ Vε(t, ω).
(iii) Since Vε(t, ω) is bounded, the cl(Vε(t, ω)) is compact. By (ii) we see that V(t, ω) =
∩ε>0cl(Vε(t, ω)) is also compact. Moreover, again since each cl(Vε(t, ω)) is compact, we see
that V(t, ω) 6= ∅ whenever cl(Vε(t, ω)) 6= ∅ for all ε > 0.
Remark 3.5 (i) It is obvious that cl(V0(t, ω)) ⊂ V(t, ω), however, the inclusion could
be strict. Note that V0(t, ω) 6= ∅ if and only if the game has a true equilibrium, while
V(t, ω) 6= ∅ can occur even if no equilibrium exists. Such a relaxation could be useful for
more general games where a true equilibrium may not exist, see e.g., Frei & dos Reis [17],
Buckdahn, Cardaliaguet, & Rainer [6], and Lin [26] for some results in this direction (the
latter two use strategies instead of closed-loop controls though).
(ii) When we view a stochastic control problem as a game with one player and denote its
(standard) value function as v(t, ω), then we always have V(t, ω) = {v(t, ω)}, but V0(t, ω)
could be empty. Similarly for a two person zero sum game, the standard value function
corresponds to V, not V0.
For the rest of the properties, we impose the following regularities.
Assumption 3.6 (i) b, f are uniformly continuous in (t, ω) under d and ξ is uniformly
continuous in ω under ‖ · ‖, with a common modulus of continuity function ρ0.
(ii) b, f are uniformly continuous in a.
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We then have the regularity and stability of V in the spirit of Feinstein [15]. However,
we note that [15] considers the set of equilibriums, while we consider the set of values. Given
Dn ⊂ RN , we define the set valued limits as in Aubin & Frankowska [2]:
lim
n→∞
Dn =
{
y ∈ RN : lim
n→∞ infyn∈Dn
|y − yn| = 0
}
lim
n→∞Dn =
{
y ∈ RN : lim
n→∞
inf
yn∈Dn
|y − yn| = 0
}
.
That is, the limit inferior (superior) denotes the set of y ∈ RN such that there exist yn ∈ Dn
(resp. subsequence) satisfying limn→∞ yn = y.
Theorem 3.7 Let Assumptions 3.1 and 3.6 (i) hold.
(i) For any ε1 < ε2, there exists δ > 0 such that
Vε1(t˜, ω˜) ⊂ Vε2(t, ω) for all (t, ω), (t˜, ω˜) satisfying d((t, ω), (t˜, ω˜)) ≤ δ. (3.3)
(ii) If d((tn, ω
n), (t, ω))→ 0, then V(t, ω) =
⋂
ε>0
[
lim
n→∞
Vε(tn, ω
n)
]
=
⋂
ε>0
[
lim
n→∞Vε(tn, ω
n)
]
.
(iii) Assume (bn, fn, ξn) satisfy Assumption 3.6 uniformly and define Vnε (t, ω) in the obvi-
ous way. If (bn, fn, ξn)→ (b, f, ξ) uniformly, then
V(t, ω) =
⋂
ε>0
[
lim
n→∞
V
n
ε (t, ω)
]
=
⋂
ε>0
[
lim
n→∞V
n
ε (t, ω)
]
.
Proof (i) We first claim that there exists a modulus of continuity function ρ such that
|J(t, ω, α) − J(t˜, ω˜, α)| ≤ ρ(d((t, ω), (t˜, ω˜))), ∀(t, ω), (t˜, ω˜),∀α. (3.4)
Then, let d((t, ω), (t˜, ω˜)) ≤ δ and y ∈ Oε1(J(t˜, ω˜, αε1)) ⊂ Vε1(t˜, ω˜) where αε1 ∈ NEε1(t˜, ω˜).
For any i and αi, by (3.4) we have
Ji(t, ω, α
ε1) ≤ Ji(t˜, ω˜, αε1) + ρ(δ) ≤ Ji(t˜, ω˜, αε1,−i, αi) + ε1 + ρ(δ)
≤ Ji(t, ω, αε1,−i, αi) + ε1 + 2ρ(δ).
Choose δ > 0 small enough such that 2ρ(δ) ≤ ε2 − ε1, we see that αε1 ∈ NEε2(t, ω).
Moreover, by (3.4) again we have
∣∣∣y − Ji(t, ω, αε1)
∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣y − Ji(t˜, ω˜, αε1)
∣∣∣+ ρ(δ) < ε1 + ρ(δ) ≤ ε2.
So y ∈ Vε2(t, ω), and hence (3.3) holds.
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We next prove (3.4). By (3.2) we have
Ji(t, ω, α) = E
P0
[
M t,ω,αT−t
[
ξt,ωi (B·) +
∫ T−t
0
f t,ωi (s,B·, α
i
s)ds
]]
. (3.5)
Similarly we have the representation for Ji(t˜, ω˜, α). Denote
OSCδ(B) := sup
|s−s˜|≤δ
|Bs −Bs˜|, ρ′(δ) := E
[
ρ20
(
δ +OSCδ(B)
)]
.
Assume without loss of generality that t ≤ t˜. Then,
E
[∣∣∣
∫ T−t
0
f t,ωi (s,B·, α
i
s)ds−
∫ T−t˜
0
f t˜,ω˜i (s,B·, α
i
s)ds
∣∣∣2]
≤ CE
[ ∫ T−t˜
0
∣∣f t,ωi (s,B·, αis)− f t˜,ω˜i (s,B·, αis)∣∣2ds+ ∣∣
∫ T−t
T−t˜
f t,ωi (s,B·, α
i
s)ds
∣∣2]
≤ CE
[ ∫ T−t˜
0
ρ20
(
d
(
(t+ s, ω ⊗t B·), (t˜+ s, ω˜ ⊗t˜ B·)
))
ds
]
+ Cδ2
≤ CE
[ ∫ T−t˜
0
ρ20
(
d
(
(t, ω), (t˜, ω˜)
)
+OSCt˜−t(B)
)
ds
]
+ Cδ2
≤ CE
[ ∫ T−t˜
0
ρ20
(
δ +OSCδ(B)
)
ds
]
+ Cδ2 ≤ Cρ′(δ) + Cδ2.
Similarly,
E
P0
[
|ξt,ωi (B·)− ξ t˜,ω˜i (B·)|2
]
≤ ρ′(δ);
E
P0
[∣∣∣
∫ T−t
0
bt,ω(s,B·, αs)dBs −
∫ T−t˜
0
bt˜,ω˜(s,B·, αs)dBs
∣∣∣2]
≤ CEP0
[ ∫ T−t˜
0
∣∣bt,ω − bt˜,ω˜∣∣2(s,B·, αs)ds +
∫ T−t
T−t˜
|bt,ω(s,B·, αs)|2ds
]
≤ Cρ′(δ) + Cδ;
E
P0
[∣∣∣
∫ T−t
0
|bt,ω(s,B·, αs)|2ds−
∫ T−t˜
0
|bt˜,ω˜(s,B·, αs)|2ds
∣∣∣2]
≤ CEP0
[ ∫ T−t˜
0
∣∣|bt,ω|2 − |bt˜,ω˜|2∣∣2(s,B·, αs)ds +
(∫ T−t
T−t˜
|bt,ω(s,B·, αs)|2ds
)2]
≤ Cρ′(δ) + Cδ2.
We note that, since b is bounded, for any p ≥ 1,
sup
α∈A
E
P0
[
(MαT )
p + (MαT )
−p
]
≤ Cp <∞. (3.6)
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Moreover, note that |ex − ex˜| ≤ [ex + ex˜]|x− x˜|. Then
E
P0
[
M t,ω,αT−t
[∣∣ξt,ωi (B·)− ξ t˜,ω˜i (B·)∣∣
]
≤ C
(
E
P0
[∣∣ξt,ωi (B·)− ξ t˜,ω˜i (B·)∣∣2
]) 1
2 ≤ C
√
ρ′(δ);
E
P0
[
M t,ω,αT−t
∣∣ ∫ T−t
0
f t,ωi (s,B·, α
i
s)ds −
∫ T−t˜
0
f t˜,ω˜i (s,B·, α
i
s)ds
∣∣]]
≤ C
(
E
P0
[∣∣ ∫ T−t
0
f t,ωi (s,B·, α
i
s)ds −
∫ T−t˜
0
f t˜,ω˜i (s,B·, α
i
s)ds
∣∣2]) 12
≤ C
√
ρ′(δ) + δ2;
E
P0
[
|M t,ω,αT−t −M t˜,ω˜,αT−t˜ |
]
≤ EP0
[
[M t,ω,αT−t +M
t˜,ω˜,α
T−t˜ ]×
[∣∣ ∫ T−t
0
bt,ω(s,B·, αs)dBs −
∫ T−t˜
0
bt˜,ω˜(s,B·, αs)dBs
∣∣
+
1
2
∣∣ ∫ T−t
0
|bt,ω(s,B·, αs)|2ds−
∫ T−t˜
0
|bt˜,ω˜(s,B·, αs)|2ds
∣∣]]
≤ C
√
ρ′(δ) + δ;
|J(t, ω, α) − J(t˜, ω˜, α)| ≤ EP0
[
M t,ω,αT−t
∣∣ξt,ωi (B·)− ξ t˜,ω˜i (B·)|
+M t,ω,αT−t
∣∣ ∫ T−t
0
f t,ωi (s,B·, α
i
s)ds−
∫ T−t˜
0
f t˜,ω˜i (s,B·, α
i
s)ds
∣∣
+|M t,ω,αT−t −M t˜,ω˜,αT−t˜ |
∣∣ξ t˜,ω˜i (B·) +
∫ T−t˜
0
f t˜,ω˜i (s,B·, α
i
s)ds
∣∣]
≤ C
√
ρ′(δ) + δ =: ρ(δ).
Clearly ρ′ and hence ρ are modulus of continuity functions, we thus obtain (3.4).
(ii) Denote δn := d((tn, ω
n), (t, ω))→ 0. For any ε1 < ε2, by (3.3) and its proof we have
Vε1(t, ω) ⊂ Vε2(tn, ωn), Vε1(tn, ωn) ⊂ Vε2(t, ω), whenever 2ρ(δn) ≤ ε2 − ε1. (3.7)
Now fix ε2 and set ρ(δn) ≤ ε24 , we see that (3.7) holds for all ε1 ≤ ε22 . This implies
immediately that V(t, ω) ⊂ Vε2(tn, ωn) and
⋂
ε1>0
[
limn→∞Vε1(t, ωn)
] ⊂ Vε2(t, ω). Now
send ε2 → 0 we have
⋂
ε1>0
[
limn→∞Vε1(t, ωn)
] ⊂ V(t, ω) ⊂ ⋂ε>0 [ limn→∞Vε(t, ωn)].
Since the limit inferior is always contained in the limit superior, hence they are all equal.
(iii) Let Jn be defined by (3.5), but corresponding to (bn, fn, ξn). It is clear that
cn := sup
t,ω,α
|[Jn − J ](t, ω, α)| → 0. Then the result follows similar arguments to (ii).
To study the measurability of the mapping (t, ω) 7→ V(t, ω), we introduce
Vˆε(t, ω) :=
⋃
ε′<ε
Vε′(t, ω).
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It is clear that
Vˆε(t, ω) ⊂ Vε(t, ω) ⊂ Vˆε˜(t, ω), ∀ε < ε˜, hence V(t, ω) =
⋂
ε>0
Vˆε(t, ω).
We then have the following result, which will be quite useful for the DPP below.
Theorem 3.8 Let Assumptions 3.1 and 3.6 (i) hold. For any ε > 0, any F-stopping time
τ , and any η ∈ L0(Fτ ), the events {ω ∈ Ω : η(ω) ∈ Vˆε(τ(ω), ω)} and {ω ∈ Ω : η(ω) ∈
V(τ(ω), ω)} are Fτ -measurable.
Proof First note that {ω : η(ω) ∈ V(τ(ω), ω)} = ⋂n≥1{ω : η(ω) ∈ Vˆ 1
n
(τ(ω), ω)}, then
the measurability for V clearly follows from the measurability for Vˆ 1
n
. We now prove the
claimed measurability for Vˆε in three steps.
Step 1. We first show that, for any t and any compact set K ⊂⊂ RN , the event {ω ∈
Ω : K ⊂ Vˆε(t, ω)} is open (in terms of ω under ‖ · ‖), and thus is obviously Ft-measurable.
Indeed, fix ω such that K ⊂ Vˆε(t, ω) =
⋃
ε′<εVε′(t, ω). Since K ⊂ RN is compact and
Vε′(t, ω) ⊂ RN is open and increasing in ε′, there exists ε1 < ε such that K ⊂ Vε1(t, ω).
Now by (3.3) we see that there exists δ > 0 such that K ⊂ V ε1+ε
2
(t, ω˜) ⊂ Vˆε(t, ω˜) whenever
‖ω˜t∧· − ωt∧·‖ ≤ δ.
Step 2. We next show the result when τ ≡ t is a constant. Note that the set of closed
balls in RN with rational centers and rational radii is countable, numerated as {Ki}i≥1.
Since Vˆε(t, ω) is open, for η ∈ L0(Ft) one can easily verify that
{ω : η(ω) ∈ Vˆε(t, ω)} =
⋃
i≥1
(
Ei ∩ {ω : η(ω) ∈ Ki}
)
,where Ei := {ω : Ki ⊂ Vˆε(t, ω)}.
Clearly {η ∈ Ki} is Ft-measurable, and by Step 1 the events Ei are also Ft-measurable,
then so is the event {ω : η(ω) ∈ Vˆε(t, ω)}.
Step 3. We now consider stopping times τ . If τ is discrete, namely taking only finitely
many values: t1, · · · , tn, then
{ω : η(ω) ∈ Vˆε(τ(ω), ω)} =
n⋃
i=1
(
{ω : η(ω) ∈ Vˆε(ti, ω)} ∩ {τ = ti}
)
,
By Step 2, {ω : η(ω) ∈ Vˆε(ti, ω)} ∈ Fti for each i, then the above clearly implies {ω : η(ω) ∈
Vˆε(τ(ω), ω)} ∈ Fτ .
Now for general τ , there exist stopping times τn ↓ τ such that each τn is discrete and
0 ≤ τn − τ ≤ 2−nT . Choose an arbitrary sequence εm ↑ ε. By (3.3) , for any m we have
{ω : η(ω) ∈ Vεm−1(τ(ω), ω)} ⊂ lim
n→∞
{ω : η(ω) ∈ Vˆεm(τn(ω), ω)}
⊂ lim
n→∞{ω : η(ω) ∈ Vˆεm(τn(ω), ω)} ⊂ {ω : η(ω) ∈ Vεm+1(τ(ω), ω)}.
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Send m → ∞ and note that the first and the last terms above have the same limit, then
the middle two terms have to converge to the same limit, namely
lim
m,n→∞{ω : η(ω) ∈ Vˆεm(τn(ω), ω)} = {ω : η(ω) ∈ Vˆε(τ(ω), ω)}. (3.8)
We already have {ω : η(ω) ∈ Vˆεm(τn(ω), ω)} ∈ Fτn . Since F is right continuous and τn ↓ τ ,
then limn→∞{ω : η(ω) ∈ Vˆεm(τn(ω), ω)} ∈ Fτ , and thus {ω : η(ω) ∈ Vˆε(τ(ω), ω)} ∈ Fτ .
3.3 Dynamic programming principle
Given an F-stopping time τ and η ∈ L∞(Fτ ;RN ), one may consider the game on [0, τ ] with
terminal condition η. In particular,
Ji(τ, η; t, ω, α) := E
Pt,ω,α
[
ηt,ωi +
∫ τ t,ω−t
0
f t,ωi (s,B·, α
i
s)ds
]
, t ≤ τ(ω), i = 1, · · · , N, (3.9)
and we can define equilibrium and ε-equilibrium at (τ, η; t, ω) in the obvious sense. We now
state our main result of this section, extending Theorem 2.8 to the continuous time model.
Theorem 3.9 Let Assumptions 3.1 and 3.6 hold. For any (t, ω) and any F-stopping time
τ with τ(ω) > t, we have
V(t, ω) =
⋂
ε>0
{
y ∈ Oε(J(τ, η; t, ω, αε)) : for all η ∈ L∞(Fτ ;RN ) and αε ∈ A
such that αε ∈ NEε(τ, η; t, ω) and P0(ηt,ω /∈ Vˆε(τ t,ω, Bt,ω· )) ≤ ε
}
.
(3.10)
To prove the theorem, we first need a lemma.
Lemma 3.10 (i) Let τ be an F-stopping time and η ∈ L∞(Fτ ;RN ). For any δ > 0, there
exist a discrete F-stopping time τδ with 0 ≤ τδ− τ ≤ δ, and an ηδ ∈ L∞(Fτδ ;RN ) with
the same bound as η, such that
E
P0
[|ηδ − η|] ≤ δ, and ηδ is uniformly continuous in ω. (3.11)
(ii) For any α ∈ A and δ > 0, there exists discrete αδ =∑n−1i=0 αδti1[ti,ti+1) ∈ A such that
E
P0
[ ∫ T
0
[|αδt − αt| ∧ 1]dt
]
≤ δ, and each αδti is uniformly continuous in ω.
Proof (i) The case τ ≡ t follows the same approximations in Zhang [40, Theorem 2.5.2]
Steps 1-4, and in this case we actually have τδ ≡ t as well. We now prove (i) for general
stopping time τ . First, clearly there exists discrete τδ such that 0 ≤ τδ − τ ≤ δ. Assume
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τδ takes values t1, · · · , tn. Since the space (Ω, ‖ · ‖) is Polish and thus P0 is tight, see e.g.
Billingsley [5], then for each i there exists a compact set1 Ki ⊂⊂ {τδ = ti} such that
Ki ∈ Fti and P0({τδ = ti}\Ki) < δ3C0n , where C0 is the bound of η. Then one may easily
construct uniformly continuous functions Ii ∈ L0(Fti ; [0, 1]) such that EP0 [|Ii−1Ki |] ≤ δ3C0n .
Next, note that η ∈ L∞(Fτδ ;RN ), then η1{τδ=ti} is Fti-measurable. Apply (3.11) for the
deterministic time case, there exist ηi ∈ L∞(Fti ;RN ) with the same bound as η such that
E
P0
[|ηi − η1{τδ=ti}|] ≤ δ3n, and ηi is uniformly continuous in ω.
Denote ηδ :=
∑n
i=1 ηiIi. Then one can easily verify that ηδ is Fτδ measurable, uniformly
continuous, and
E
P0
[|ηδ − η|] ≤
n∑
i=1
E
P0
[|ηiIi − η1{τδ=ti}|]
≤
n∑
i=1
E
P0
[
|ηi[Ii − 1Ki ]|+ |ηi[1Ki − 1{τδ=ti}]|+ |ηi − η1{τδ=ti}|1{τδ=ti}
]
≤
n∑
i=1
[
C0
δ
3C0n
+ C0
δ
3C0n
+
δ
3n
]
= δ.
This proves (3.11) for the general stopping time τ .
(ii) First, denote αRt := αt1{|αt|≤R}. Then limR→∞ E
[ ∫ T
0 [|αRt − αt| ∧ 1]dt
]
= 0. By
otherwise choosing an αR, without loss of generality we assume α is bounded. Next, for
each n, denote ti :=
i
n
T , i = 0, · · · , n. Denote αnt := 0, t ∈ [t0, t1], and αnt := nT
∫ ti
ti−1
αsds,
t ∈ (ti, ti+1], i = 1, · · · , n− 1. Then E
[ ∫ T
0 |αnt − αt|dt
]
≤ δ2 for n large. Now fix such an n.
For each αnti , by (i) we may construct uniformly continuous α
δ
ti
such that E[|αδti −αnti |] ≤ δ2 .
Then clearly αδ satisfies all the claimed properties.
Proof of Theorem 3.9. For notational simplicity, we assume t = 0, then (3.10) becomes:
V(0, 0) = V˜ (0, 0) :=
⋂
ε>0 V˜ε(0, 0) where
V˜ε(0, 0) :=
{
y ∈ Oε(J(τ, η; 0, 0, αε)) : for all η ∈ L∞(Fτ ;RN ) and αε ∈ A
such that αε ∈ NEε(τ, η; 0, 0) and P0(η /∈ Vˆε(τ,B·)) ≤ ε
}
.
(3.12)
Step 1. We first prove the ⊂ part. Fix an arbitrary y ∈ V(0, 0). To show y ∈ V˜ (0, 0),
we fix an arbitrary ε > 0. Let δ > 0 be a small number which will be specified later.
Since y ∈ Vδ(0, 0), there exists α˜δ ∈ NEδ(0, 0) such that |y − J(0, 0, α˜δ)| ≤ δ. For any
δ1 > 0, apply Lemma 3.10 (ii) on α˜
δ, there exists αδ =
∑n−1
i=0 α
δ
ti
1[ti,ti+1) ∈ A such that αδti
1More rigorously, we should first get an FBti -measurable set Ei ⊂ {τδ = ti} with P0({τδ = ti}\Ei) = 0,
and then apply [5] to obtain the desired Ki ⊂⊂ Ei.
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is uniformly continuous in ω and EP0
[ ∫ T
0 [|α˜δt −αδt |∧1]dt
] ≤ δ1. By Assumption 3.6 (ii) and
(3.5), for δ1 small enough (depending on δ) we see that
αδ ∈ NE2δ(0, 0) and |y − J(0, 0, αδ)| ≤ 2δ. (3.13)
Define
ηδ(ω) := J(τ(ω), ω, (αδ)τ(ω),ω). (3.14)
By (3.4) and Assumption 3.6 (ii) again, it is clear that ηδ is Fτ -measurable. Note that, for
any α ∈ A, J(τ, ηδ ; 0, 0, α) = J(0, 0, α˜), where α˜ := α1[0,τ ] + αδ1(τ,T ]. Then (3.13) implies
αδ ∈ NE2δ(τ, ηδ , 0, 0) and |y−J(τ, ηδ ; 0, 0, αδ)| ≤ 2δ. We shall always set 2δ ≤ ε. Moreover,
set εm ↑ ε and τn ↓ τ be as in Theorem 3.8 Step 3. We claim that, for any m,
lim
δ→0
lim
n→∞P0
({ω : ηδ(ω) /∈ Vˆεm(τn(ω), ω)}) = 0. (3.15)
Then, by (3.8) and noting that Vˆε is increasing in ε, we can easily see that
lim
δ→0
P0
({ω : ηδ(ω) /∈ Vˆε(τ(ω), ω)}) = lim
δ→0
lim
m,n→∞P0
({ω : ηδ(ω) /∈ Vˆεm(τn(ω), ω)})
≤ lim
δ→0
lim
n→∞P0
({ω : ηδ(ω) /∈ Vˆε1(τn(ω), ω)}) = 0.
This verifies all the requirements in (3.12) and thus y ∈ V˜ε(0, 0).
We now prove (3.15) for m = 1. Since αδ is uniformly continuous in ω, by (3.9) and
Assumption 3.6 (ii), similar to (3.4) we have
lim
n→∞E
[|ηδn − ηδ |] = 0, where ηδn(ω) := J(τn(ω), ω, (αδ)τn(ω),ω). (3.16)
Note that
{
ω : ηδ(ω) /∈ Vˆε1(τn(ω), ω)
} ⊂ {ω : ηδ(ω) /∈ Vε2(τn(ω), ω)}
⊂ Eδn ∪
{
ω : |ηδ(ω)− ηδn(ω)| > ε2
}
,
where, assuming τn takes values ti, i = 0, · · · , 2n,
Eδn :=
2n⋃
i=0
Ei, Ei := {τn = ti} ∩
{
ω : (αδ)ti,ω /∈ NEε2(ti, ω)
}
. (3.17)
Then
P0
({
ω : ηδ(ω) /∈ Vˆε1(τn(ω), ω)
}) ≤ P0(Eδn) + 1ε2E
P0
[
|ηδn − ηδ(ω)|
]
.
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By (3.16), it suffices to show that
lim
δ→0
lim
n→∞P0(E
δ
n) = 0. (3.18)
Now fix δ, n. Let δ′ > 0 be another small number which will be specified later. Note
that Ω is separable, we may have a decomposition Ei = ∪j≥1Ei,j on Fti such that, for
some fixed ωi,j ∈ Ei,j, sup0≤s≤ti |ωs − ωi,js | ≤ δ′ for all ω ∈ Ei,j. Now for each (i, j), since
(αδ)ti,ω
i,j
/∈ NEε2(ti, ωi,j), there exists k = 1, · · · , N and αi,j,k ∈ A such that
(ηδn)k(ω
i,j) = Jk(ti, ω
i,j , (αδ)ti,ω
i,j
) > Jk(ti, ω
i,j , (αδ,−k)ti,ω
i,j
, αi,j,k) + ε2. (3.19)
Again by (3.9) and Assumption 3.6 (ii), and since αδ is uniformly continuous in ω, then
ω 7→ Jk(ti, ω, (αδ)ti,ω) and ω 7→ Jk(ti, ω, (αδ,−k)ti,ω, αi,j,k) are uniformly continuous. Thus,
for δ′ small enough,
Jk(ti, ω, (α
δ)ti,ω) > Jk(ti, ω, (α
δ,−k)ti,ω, αi,j,k) +
ε2
2
, ∀ω ∈ Ei,j. (3.20)
Denote Eki,j := {ω ∈ Ei,j : (3.19) holds}. Then Eδn =
⋃N
k=1E
k, where Ek :=
⋃2n
i=0
⋃
j≥1E
k
ij .
One can easily construct αk ∈ Ak such that (αk)ti,ωt = αi,j,kt for (t, ω) ∈ [ti, T ] × Eki,j, and
αkt = (α
δ)kt for all other (t, ω). Then by (3.20) we have
Jk(τn(ω), ω, (α
δ)τn(ω),ω) > Jk(τn(ω), ω, (α
δ,−k)τn(ω),ω, (αk)τn(ω),ω) +
ε2
2
, ∀ω ∈ Ek;
Jk(τn, ω, (α
δ)τn(ω),ω) = Jk(τn(ω), ω, (α
δ,−k)τn(ω),ω, (αk)τn(ω),ω), ∀ω /∈ Ek.
Note that αkt = (α
δ)kt for t ≤ τn. Then, since αδ ∈ NE2δ(0, 0),
2δ ≥ Jk(0, 0, αδ)− Jk(0, 0, αδ,−k , αk)
= EP
0,0,αδ
[
Jk(τn(ω), ω, (α
δ)τn(ω),ω)− Jk(τn(ω), ω, (αδ,−k)τn(ω),ω, (αk)τn(ω),ω)
]
≥ ε2
2
P
0,0,αδ(Ek) =
ε2
2
E
P0
[
M0,0,α
δ
τn 1Ek
]
.
Thus, by (3.6),
P0(E
k) = EP0
[
(M0,0,α
δ
τn )
− 1
2 (M0,0,α
δ
τn )
1
21Ek
]
≤ C
(
E
P0
[
M0,0,α
δ
τn 1Ek
]) 12 ≤ C
√
δ
ε2
.
Then P0(E
δ
n) ≤ CN
√
δ
ε2
. This implies (3.18) and hence (3.15) immediately.
Step 2. To see the opposite inclusion, we fix y ∈ V˜(0, 0) and ε > 0. Let δ > 0 be a small
number which will be specified later. Since y ∈ V˜δ(0, 0), let η, αδ be the corresponding terms
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in (3.12) corresponding to δ. Moreover, set δn ↓ 0 and let (τn, ηn) be the approximations of
(τ, η) as in Lemma 3.10 (i) with error δn. Note that, for any k = 1, · · · , N and any αk ∈ Ak,
∣∣∣Jk(τn, ηn; 0, 0, αδ,−k , αk)− Jk(τ, η; 0, 0, αδ,−k , αk)
∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣EP0[Mαδ,−k ,αkτn
[
[(ηn)k − ηk] +
∫ τn
τ
fk(s,B, α
δ,−k
s , α
k
s)ds
]∣∣∣ (3.21)
≤ C
(
E
P0 [|ηn − η|]
) 1
2
+ C2−n ≤ δ,
when n is large enough. Thus
Jk(τn, ηn; 0, 0, α
δ)− Jk(τn, ηn; 0, 0, αδ,−k, αk)
≤ Jk(τ, η; 0, 0, αδ)− Jk(τ, η; 0, 0, αδ,−k , αk) + 2δ ≤ 3δ, ∀αk ∈ Ak.
(3.22)
That is, αδ ∈ NE3δ(τn, ηn; 0, 0) and y ∈ O2δ(J(τn, ηn; 0, 0, αδ)) for n large enough.
Next, by (3.8) and noting that Vˆδ is increasing in δ, we have
lim
n→∞P0(η /∈ Vˆδ(τn, B·)) ≤ P0(η /∈ Vˆδ(τ,B·)) ≤ δ.
Note that {η ∈ Vˆδ(τn, B)} ∩ {|ηn − η| ≤ δ} ⊂ {ηn ∈ Vˆ2δ(τn, B)}, then
lim
n→∞P0(ηn /∈ Vˆ2δ(τn, B·)) ≤ limn→∞
[
P0(η /∈ Vˆδ(τn, B·)) + 1
δ
E
P0 [|ηn − η|]
]
≤ δ.
Thus, for n large enough,
P0((E
δ
n)
c) ≤ 2δ, where Eδn := {ηn ∈ Vˆ2δ(τn, B·)}. (3.23)
Now fix δ, n. Denote Ei := E
δ
n ∩ {τn = ti}. Let δ′ > 0 be another small number which
will be specified later. Similar to Step 1 we have decomposition Ei = ∪j≥1Ei,j on Fti such
that, for some fixed ωi,j ∈ Ei,j , sup0≤s≤ti |ωs − ωi,js | ≤ δ′ for all ω ∈ Ei,j. Now for each
(i, j), since ηn(ω
i,j) ∈ Vˆ2δ(ti, ωi,j) ⊂ V2δ(ti, ωi,j), there exists αi,j ∈ A such that
αi,j ∈ NE2δ(ti, ωi,j)), |ηn(ωi,j)− J(ti, ωi,j, αi,j)| ≤ 2δ.
Since ηn and J(ti, ω, α
i,j) are uniformly continuous in ω, for δ′ small enough we have
|ηn(ω)− ηn(ωi,j)| ≤ δ, sup
α
|J(ti, ω, α) − J(ti, ωi,j, α)| ≤ δ, ∀ω ∈ Ei,j.
Denote
η˜n(ω) :=
∑
i,j
1Ei,j (ω)J(ti, ω, α
i,j) + 1(Eδn)c(ω)J(τn(ω), ω, (α
δ)τn(ω),ω). (3.24)
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Then
|η˜n − ηn| ≤
∑
i,j
1Ei,j(ω)|J(ti, ω, αi,j)− ηn(ω)|+ C1(Eδn)c
≤
∑
i,j
1Ei,j(ω)
[
|J(ti, ω, αi,j)− J(ti, ωi,j, αi,j)|+ |J(ti, ωi,j, αi,j)− ηn(ωi,j)|
+|ηn(ωi,j)− ηn(ω)|
]
+ C1(Eδn)c ≤ 4δ + C1(Eδn)c .
Similar to (3.21) and (3.22), by (3.23) one can easily show that
αδ ∈ NE
C
√
δ
(τn, η˜n; 0, 0) and y ∈ OC√δ(J(τn, η˜n; 0, 0, αδ)). (3.25)
We now define
αδ,nt := α
δ
t1[0,τn](t) + 1(τn,T ](t)
[∑
i,j
1Ei,jα
i,j
t−τn + α
δ
t1(Eδn)c
]
. (3.26)
Then η˜n(ω) = J(τn(ω), ω, (α
δ,n)τn(ω),ω) for all ω ∈ Ω. For k = 1, · · · , N and for αk ∈ Ak,
Jk(0, 0, α
δ,n) = Jk(τn, η˜n; 0, 0, α
δ) ≤ Jk(τn, η˜n; 0, 0, αδ,−k, αk) + C
√
δ
= EP
αδ,−k,αk
[
η˜n(ω) +
∫ τn
0
fk(s, ω, α
δ,−k
s , α
k
s )ds
]]
+ C
√
δ
≤ EPα
δ,−k,αk
[∑
i,j
1Ei,jJk(ti, ω, α
i,j) + C1(Eδn)c +
∫ τn
0
fk(s, ω, α
δ,−k
s , α
k
s )ds
]]
+ C
√
δ
≤ EPα
δ,−k,αk
[∑
i,j
1Ei,jJk(ti, ω
i,j, αi,j) +
∫ τn
0
fk(s, ω, α
δ,−k
s , α
k
s )ds
]]
+ C
√
δ
≤ EPα
δ,−k,αk
[∑
i,j
1Ei,jJk(ti, ω
i,j, αi,j,−k, (αk)ti,ω) +
∫ τn
0
fk(s, ω, α
δ,−k
s , α
k
s )ds
]]
+ C
√
δ
≤ EPα
δ,−k,αk
[∑
i,j
1Ei,jJk(ti, ω, α
i,j,−k, (αk)ti,ω) +
∫ τn
0
fk(s, ω, α
δ,−k
s , α
k
s )ds
]]
+ C
√
δ
≤ EPα
δ,−k,αk
[
Jk(τn(ω), ω, (α
δ,n,−k, αk)τn(ω),ω) +
∫ τn
0
fk(s, ω, α
δ,−k
s , α
k
s )ds
]]
+ C
√
δ
= Jk(0, 0, α
δ,n,−k, αk) + C
√
δ.
That is, αδ,n ∈ NE
C
√
δ
(0, 0), and y ∈ O
C
√
δ
(J(τn, η˜n; 0, 0, α
δ)) = O
C
√
δ
(J(0, 0, αδ,n)). Then
y ∈ V
C
√
δ
(0, 0), and thus y ∈ Vε(0, 0) when C
√
δ ≤ ε.
Remark 3.11 In the state dependent setting, namely
b = b(t, ωt, a), f = f(t, ωt, a), ξ = g(ωT ), (3.27)
as in Subsection 2.4 we can show that V(t, ω) = V(t, ωt) is also state dependent, but the
DPP still involves path dependent η and αε.
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3.4 A duality result
In this subsection we provide an alternative characterization for the set value V(t, ω). The
idea is similar to the level set or nodal set approach, see e.g. Barles, Soner, & Souganidis
[3], Ma & Yong [27], and Karnam, Ma, & Zhang [25]. In particular, this method could be
efficient for numerical purpose.
We first note that, for any (t, ω) and α ∈ A, J(t, ω, α) = Y t,ω,α0 , where (Y t,ω,α, Zt,ω,α)
is the solution to the following (linear) BSDE on [0, T − t]:
Y t,ω,α,is = ξ
t,ω
i (B) +
∫ T−t
s
f t,ωi (r,B, αr, Z
t,ω,α,i
r )dr −
∫ T−t
s
Zt,ω,α,ir dBr,
where fi(t, ω, a, zi) := fi(t, ω, ai) + b(t, ω, a)zi.
(3.28)
For each i and a−i = (a1, · · · , ai−1, ai+1, · · · , aN ), denote
f
i
(t, ω, a−i, zi) := inf
ai∈Ai
fi(t, ω, a
−i, ai, zi).
Since b is bounded, f
i
is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in zi. Introduce the following
multidimensional BSDE: i = 1, · · · , N ,
Y t,ω,α,is = ξ
t,ω
i (B) +
∫ T−t
s
f t,ω
i
(r,B, α−ir , Z
t,ω,α,i
r )dr −
∫ T−t
s
Zt,ω,α,ir dBr. (3.29)
It is clear that, see e.g. El-Karoui & Hamadene [13], α∗ ∈ NE(t, ω) if and only if
f t,ω
i
(r,B, α∗,−ir , Z
t,ω,α∗,i
r ) = f
t,ω
i (r,B, α
∗
r , Z
t,ω,α∗,i
r ), a.s., 0 ≤ r ≤ T − t, i = 1, · · · , N.(3.30)
Our main idea of the duality approach is to rewrite (3.29) as a forward diffusion, by
viewing the component Z as a control. To be precise, fix (t, ω, y) ∈ [0, T ] × Ω × RN . For
any α ∈ A and Z = (Z1, · · · , ZN ), denote
Y t,ω,y,α,Z,is := yi −
∫ s
0
f t,ω
i
(r,B, α−ir , Z
i
r)dr +
∫ s
0
ZirdBr. (3.31)
We then introduce an auxiliary control problem:
W (t, ω, y) := inf
α∈A,Z∈L2(F,P0)
N∑
i=1
E
P0
[
|ξt,ωi (B)− Y t,ω,y,α,Z,iT−t |2
+
∫ T−t
0
[∆f t,ωi (s,B, αs, Z
i
s)]
3
2ds
]
,
where ∆fi(t, ω, a, zi) := fi(t, ω, a, zi)− f i(t, ω, a−i, zi).
(3.32)
Here the power 32 (between 1 and 2) for the f -term is for some technical reasons on which we
will elaborate later. By (3.29)-(3.30), it is obvious that W (t, ω, y) = 0 for all y ∈ V0(t, ω).
Our main result of this subsection is that the set value agrees with the nodal set of W .
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Theorem 3.12 Let Assumptions 3.1 and 3.6 hold. Then, for any (t, ω),
V(t, ω) = N(t, ω) :=
{
y ∈ RN : W (t, ω, y) = 0}.
Proof Without loss of generality, we assume (t, ω) = (0, 0), and for notational simplicity
we may omit (0, 0) when there is no confusion, for example J(α) := J(0, 0, α).
(i) We first show that N(0, 0) ⊂ V(0, 0). Fix y ∈ N(0, 0). For any ε > 0, there exist αε
and Zε such that, denoting Y ε := Y y,α
ε,Zε ,
E
P0
[
|ξi − Y ε,iT |2 +
∫ T
0
[∆fi(s,B, α
ε
s, Z
ε,i
s )]
3
2 ds
]
≤ ε2, i ≥ 1. (3.33)
Let (Y˜ ε, Z˜ε) solve the following BSDE:
Y˜ ε,it = ξi(B) +
∫ T
t
fi(s,B, α
ε
s, Z˜
ε,i
s )ds−
∫ T
t
Z˜ε,is dBs.
Note that
Y ε,it = Y
ε,i
T +
∫ T
t
f
i
(s,B, αε,−is , Z
ε,i
s )ds−
∫ T
t
Zε,is dBs. (3.34)
Then, denoting ∆Y i := Y˜ ε,i − Y ε,i and ∆Zi := Z˜ε,i − Zε,i, we have
∆Y it = ξi(B)− Y ε,iT +
∫ T
t
∆fi(s,B, α
ε
s, Z
ε,i
s )ds+
∫ T
t
b(s,B, αεs)∆Z
i
sds−
∫ T
t
∆ZisdBr.
Thus, recalling (3.2) for M ,
∆Y i0 = E
P0
[
Mα
ε
T
[
ξi(B)− Y ε,iT +
∫ T
0
∆fi(s,B, α
ε
s, Z
ε,i
s )ds
]]
.
By (3.6) and (3.33) (in particular noting the power 32 for the f -term is greater than 1), it
is clear that |Y˜ ε,i0 − Y ε,i0 | ≤ Cε. Moreover, let (Yˆ ε, Zˆε) solve the following BSDE:
Yˆ ε,is = ξi(B) +
∫ T
s
f
i
(s,B, αε,−is , Zˆ
ε,i
s )dr −
∫ T
s
Zˆε,ir dBr. (3.35)
Compare (3.34) and (3.35), it follows from (3.33) again that |Y˜ ε,i0 − Yˆ ε,i0 | ≤ Cε, and thus
|Yˆ ε,i0 − Y ε,i0 | ≤ Cε.
On the other hand, for any αi, applying the comparison principle on BSDEs (3.28) and
(3.35) we see that Ji(α
ε,−i, αi) ≥ Yˆ ε,i0 . Then
Ji(α
ε) = Y ε,i0 ≤ Yˆ ε,i0 + Cε ≤ Ji(αε,−i, αi) + Cε,
and thus αε ∈ NECε(0, 0). Recall J(αε) = Y ε0 = y, then y ∈ VCε(0, 0). Since ε is arbitrary,
we obtain y ∈ V(0, 0).
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(ii) We next show that V(0, 0) ⊂ N(0, 0). Fix y ∈ V(0, 0). For any ε > 0, there exists
αε ∈ NEε(0, 0) such that |y − J(αε)| ≤ ε. Recall that J(αε) = Y αε0 , where (Y α
ε
, Zα
ε
) is
defined by (3.28). Let (Yˆ ε, Zˆε) be defined by (3.35). For each i, there exists αi such that
fi(r,B, α
ε,−i
r , α
i
r, Zˆ
ε,i
r ) ≤ f i(r,B, αε,−i, Zˆε,ir ) + ε. (3.36)
Let (Yˇ ε,i, Zˇε,i) solve the following BSDE:
Yˇ ε,is = ξi(B) +
∫ T
s
fi(r,B, α
ε,−i
r , α
i
r, Zˇ
ε,i
r )dr −
∫ T
s
Zˇε,ir dBr. (3.37)
Compare BSDEs (3.35) and (3.37), it follows from (3.36) that Yˇ ε,i0 ≤ Yˆ ε,i0 +Cε. Moreover,
since αε ∈ NEε(0, 0), then Y α
ε,i
0 ≤ Yˇ ε,i0 + ε ≤ Yˆ ε,i0 + Cε. By the comparison principle
of BSDEs we know that Y α
ε,i
0 ≥ Yˆ ε,i0 . Thus |Y α
ε,i
0 − Yˆ ε,i0 | ≤ Cε. This, together with
|y − Y αε0 | ≤ ε, implies that |y − Yˆ ε0 | ≤ Cε.
Finally, note that
Y y,α
ε,Zˆε,i
T − ξi(B) = Y y,α
ε,Zˆε,i
T − Y
Yˆ ε0 ,α
ε,Zˆε,i
T = yi − Yˆ ε,i0 . (3.38)
Moreover, note that f
i
is uniformly Lipschitz in z. Then, denoting ∆Zi := Zα
ε,i − Zˆε,i,
Cε ≥ Y αε,i0 − Yˆ ε,i0
=
∫ T
0
[fi(s,B, α
ε
s, Z
αε,i
s )− f i(s,B, αε,−is , Zˆε,is )]ds−
∫ T
0
∆ZisdBs
=
∫ T
0
∆fi(s,B, α
ε
s, Zˆ
ε,i
s )ds+
∫ T
0
b(s,B, αεs)∆Z
i
sds−
∫ T
0
∆ZisdBs.
This implies that
E
P0
[
Mα
ε
T
∫ T
0
∆fi(s,B, α
ε
s, Zˆ
ε,i
s )ds
]
≤ Cε. (3.39)
Since ξ and f are bounded, by standard BSDE estimates we have EP0
[ ∫ T
0 |Zˆε,is |2ds
]
≤ C.
Note further that
0 ≤ ∆fi(t, ω, a, z) ≤ C[1 + |z|].
One can easily derive from (3.6) and (3.39) that (thanks to the fact 32 < 2)
E
P0
[ ∫ T
0
[∆fi(s,B, α
ε
s, Zˆ
ε,i
s )]
3
2ds
]
≤ CEP0
[
(Mα
ε
T )
− 1
4 (Mα
ε
T )
1
4
∫ T
0
[∆fi(s,B, α
ε
s, Zˆ
ε,i
s )]
1
4 ds
∫ T
0
[1 + |Zˆε,is |
5
4 ]
]
≤ C
(
E
P0
[
(Mα
ε
T )
−2]) 18(
E
P0
[
Mα
ε
T
∫ T
0
∆fi(s,B, α
ε
s, Zˆ
ε,i
s )ds
]) 14(
E
P0
[ ∫ T
0
[1 + |Zˆε,is |2]
]) 58
≤ Cε 14 .
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This, together with (3.38), implies that
E
P0
[
|ξi(B)− Y y,α
ε,Zˆε,i
T |2 +
∫ T
0
[∆fi(s,B, α
ε
s, Zˆ
ε,i
s )]
3
2ds
]
≤ Cε 14 .
Then, by (3.32) we have W (0, 0, y) ≤ CNε 14 . Since ε is arbitrary, we get W (0, 0, y) = 0,
that is, y ∈ N(0, 0).
Note that (3.32) is a standard path dependent control problem. Following Zhang [40,
Section 11.3.3] we have the following result whose proof is omitted.
Proposition 3.13 Let Assumptions 3.1 and 3.6 hold. Then W ∈ C([0, T × Ω × RN ) is a
viscosity solution of the following path dependent PDE:
∂tW + inf
a∈A,z∈RN×d
[1
2
tr (∂2ωωW ) +
1
2
tr (z⊤∂2yyWz) + tr (z
⊤∂yωW )
+
N∑
i=1
[
[∆fi(t, ω, a, zi)]
3
2 − f
i
(t, ω, a−i, zi)∂yiW
]]
= 0;
W (T, ω, y) = |ξ(ω)− y|2.
(3.40)
Remark 3.14 (i) The path derivatives ∂ωW,∂
2
ωωW are introduced by Dupire [10], and
we refer to Zhang [40, Section 9.4] for more details. Note that this path dependent
PDE is always degenerate and the control is unbounded, so the uniqueness of viscosity
solution is not completely covered by Ekren, Touzi, & Zhang [11, 12] and Ren, Touzi,
& Zhang [35]. This problem is in general challenging and is left for future research.
(ii) In the state dependent case as in Remark 3.11, W = W (t, x, y) also becomes state
dependent and the path dependent PDE (3.40) reduces to a standard HJB equation:
∂tW + inf
a∈A,z∈RN×d
[1
2
tr (∂2xxW ) +
1
2
tr (z⊤∂2yyWz) + tr (z
⊤∂yxW )
+
N∑
i=1
[
[∆fi(t, x, a, zi)]
3
2 − f
i
(t, x, a−i, zi)∂yiW
]]
= 0;
W (T, x, y) = |g(x)− y|2.
This PDE is also degenerate and with unbounded controls though.
(iii) In light of Theorem 3.12, PPDE (3.40), especially PDE (3.41) in the state dependent
case, is quite useful for numerical computation of the set value V(t, ω).
Remark 3.15 Roughly speaking (modulus the existence of optimal controls in (3.32)), y
is in the nodal set N(t, ω) if and only if there exists α,Z such that Y t,ω,y,α,Z in (3.31) hits
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the target ξt,ω(B) at T − t. This is in the spirit of Cardaliaguet, Quincampoix, & Saint-
Pierre [9]. However, we note that [9] uses strategy versus controls, while we use closed-loop
controls for all players.
Remark 3.16 In this remark we make further connection between the game and BSDEs.
(i) In the literature, one may indeed use (3.30) to find equilibriums, especially in the state
dependent setting (3.27), see e.g. Hamadene, Lepeltier, & Peng [20], Hamadene & Mu
[22, 23], and Espinosa & Touzi [14]. To be precise, assume there exist a measurable
function ϕ : [0, T ]× Rd × (Rd)N → A such that, for i = 1, · · · , N ,
f
i
(t, x, ϕ−i(t, x, z), zi) = fi(t, x, ϕ(t, x, z), zi), (3.41)
and the following BSDEs have a strong solution (setting (t, x) = (0, 0) for simplicity):
Y is = gi(BT ) +
∫ T
s
f
i
(r,Br, ϕ
−i(r,Br, Zr), Z
i
r)dr −
∫ T
s
ZirdBr, (3.42)
then α∗t := ϕ(t, Bt, Zt) is a Nash equilibrium at (0, 0). However, we should note that
the function ϕ, assuming its existence, may not be continuous and thus the wellposed-
ness of (3.42) may not be easy. Even worse, in order to obtain the whole set V0(0, 0),
as we noted before we need to consider path dependent ϕ : [0, T ] × Ω × (Rd)N → A,
which will make the wellposedness of (3.42) even harder. Nevertheless, by (3.30) it
is true that the set V0 can be constructed by first finding all path dependent func-
tions ϕ satisfying (3.41) and then finding all strong solutions of the multidimensional
BSDE (3.42), where both (3.41) and (3.42) should be extended to the path dependent
setting.
(ii) One may replace the linear BSDE (3.28) with nonlinear BSDEs:
Y t,ω,α,is = ξ
t,ω
i (B) +
∫ T−t
s
f t,ωi (r,B, αr, Y
t,ω,α,i
r , Z
t,ω,α,i
r )dr −
∫ T−t
s
Zt,ω,α,ir dBr,
where fi : [0, T ]×Ω×A×R×Rd → R is nonlinear in (y, z). Still define J(t, ω, α) :=
Y t,ω,α0 , then one can show without significant difficulties that all the results in this
section hold true after obvious modifications.
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